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DRONE INVASION: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
REBECCA L. SCHARF*
Since the birth of the concept of a legally recognized right to privacy in Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’ influential 1890 law review article, “The Right
to Privacy,”1 common law—with the aid of influential scholars—has massaged the
concept of privacy torts into actionable claims. But now, one of the most innovative
technological advancements in recent years, the unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone,
has created difficult challenges for plaintiffs and courts navigating common law
privacy tort claims.
This Article explores the challenges of prosecution of the specific privacy tort of
intrusion upon seclusion involving nongovernmental use of drone technology.
Specifically, it proposes that drone technology must be an added consideration when
determining the two elements of the intrusion upon seclusion privacy tort. The
current common law invasion of privacy tort analysis is not sufficient to protect an
individual’s right to privacy for torts committed using the modern and complex
technology of drones. Thus, consideration of drone technology must be weaved into
analyzing whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Further, this Article analyzes and evaluates the practical problems that arise in
prosecuting intrusion upon seclusion claims in the drone-age, and how certain
states’ statutes address or fail to address these issues. From determining the owner
of the drone so as to name a defendant, to proving intent, it is almost impossible for
a plaintiff to survive to establish a successful intrusion upon seclusion claim.
Moreover, this Article suggests statutes may combat many of the problems in
prosecuting drone-related privacy tort claims by incorporating a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant intruded upon the plaintiff’s seclusion once the
plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case. This presumption is like the presumptions
found in many state statutes regarding physical damage from torts committed with
aircrafts against a person or property. Thus, because the defendant, a prudent drone
owner, would be in the best position to disprove the intrusion, the defendant could
rebut the claim by introducing such evidence as flight path data, photo or video
footage, or possession at the time of the alleged intrusion.
With the constantly evolving technology and innovation in the age of drones,
prosecuting William Prosser’s concept of the “right . . . ‘to be let alone’”2 when an
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1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
2. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (internal citations
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individual’s right to privacy is violated comes with many challenges. Although other
scholarship discusses the relationship between drones and privacy torts, this Article
is novel in that it explores the practical issues of prosecuting intrusion upon
seclusion claims in the age of drones. It further recommends considerations for
courts and legislators when the right to privacy and drones collide.
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INTRODUCTION
As drones3 become more common in the United States, so too do situations where
drone operators “find themselves, either intentionally or unintentionally, running up
against the law.”4 In 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicted

omitted).
3. A variety of terms are used to describe “unmanned” aircraft: drones, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), unmanned aircraft (UA), and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which refer
either “to the system [or] systems in the aircraft or the aircraft-ground station system.” Donna
A. Dulo, Aeronautical Foundations of the Unmanned Aircraft, in UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN
THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE: CRITICAL ISSUES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE LAW 21, 21 n.1 (Donna A.
Dulo ed., 2015). The term “drone” is used throughout this Article for purposes of consistency.
4. ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL & DAN GETTINGER, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE
AT BARD COLLEGE, DRONE INCIDENTS: A SURVEY OF LEGAL CASES 1 (2017),
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2017/04/CSD-Drone-Incidents.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6BU8UVQ].
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there would be 15,000 drones purchased annually in the United States alone by
2020.5 Instead, there were 616,000 drones registered in 20166 and the FAA now
predicts seven million drones could be purchased annually by 2020.7 As more and
more drones outfitted with technological advancements begin soaring through the
skies, the likelihood that individuals’ privacy will be intruded upon is
correspondingly increasing. Even in the face of this heightened risk to privacy,
however, the FAA and Congress are failing to take action to protect individuals, and
state legislatures are only slowly developing statutes to protect privacy interests. 8
These state statutes, however, largely remain untested as they are merely speculative
and derived from privacy laws that give little weight or consideration to the nuanced
and technological features of drones. Moreover, existing common-law privacy torts
are not sufficient to address the complex and multilayered technologies that can be
outfitted on drones.
“Given that no nation-wide drone-specific privacy laws exist, [state and local]
prosecutors have used a variety of charges to address privacy-related drone incidents,
including local drone ordinances.”9 For example, in one of the first prosecutions in
the United States for unlawful surveillance using a drone by a private citizen, a
resident of New York was arrested after taking photos and video of a medical
building using his drone.10 At the two-day trial, the drone operator took the position
that he was flying his drone to take “videos and photos of the façade of the structure”
while waiting for his mother’s medical appointment to conclude.11 He further argued
that the drone’s camera was not equipped with a zoom lens, the building’s windows
were tinted, and the footage did not show the building’s interior.12 Although the
prosecutors and the employees expressed concern about patient privacy, the jury
acquitted the drone’s operator.13
In Wisconsin in 2015, a drone operator was found guilty of five out of six
municipal citations for his use of a drone “to harass residents in a DeForest
neighborhood.”14 The charges came in response to numerous reports from residents

5. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2010-2030, at 48
(2010).
6. Drone Registration Marks First Anniversary, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Dec. 21, 2016,
11:48 AM), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=87049 [https://perma.cc/QP23
-7SFT].
7. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2016-2036, at 31
(2016) [hereinafter FAA, YEARS 2016-2036].
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE § 21-213 (2009); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.103 (LexisNexis 2016); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2)(a) (West 2017).
9. MICHEL & GETTINGER, supra note 4, at 3.
10. Ariél Zangla, David Beesmer Acquitted in Town of Ulster Drone Surveillance Case,
DAILY FREEMAN (June 22, 2015), https://www.dailyfreeman.com/news/david-beesmer
-acquitted-in-town-of-ulster-drone-surveillance-case/article_04e5d53a-195e-5705-866b
-ffe46e101a22.html [https://perma.cc/Y39H-2EPW].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Joe Pruski, Drone Ace Has Day in Court, DEFOREST TIMES-TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.hngnews.com/deforest_times/news/local/article_47b07034-6e90-11e5-860e
-e7a77ccd08e7.html [https://perma.cc/WV4P-ZKGV].
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that a drone was “flying near their windows and observing them on their private
property.”15 After a bench trial, the judge found the drone operator guilty on four
disorderly conduct citations and a citation for unlawful use of a drone. 16 The
ordinance that the operator violated had been recently adopted and made it illegal for
an “individual to use a drone to observe a person in a place where that person should
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”17
In a similar incident in early 2017, a couple in Orem, Utah, used a drone equipped
with a video camera to observe neighbors in their homes. 18 One of the victims of the
couple’s voyeurism spotted the drone outside of his bathroom, chased it down with
his truck, and seized it once it landed in a church parking lot and no one came to
retrieve it.19 The victim, who was familiar with drones, reviewed the drone’s photo
card and discovered “hours of footage of the drone peering into the homes of houses
around the neighborhood.”20 He then turned the drone over to the police, who were
able to locate the couple with the help of the footage and a Facebook post. 21 The
couple was each charged with a misdemeanor count of voyeurism using concealed
or disguised electronic equipment.22
But, even with the new statutes and ordinances and their application to drone
operators, there is still a gap in the law for basic privacy violations involving drones.
For example, a Florida father sought police intervention when he noticed a drone
above his home.23 He claimed that on several occasions the drone loomed over his
house and followed his children around the neighborhood. 24 The drone’s pilot was a
neighbor who had been arrested the month prior for allegedly trying to lure children
into his car.25 Although the family believed that “[i]t was definitely an invasion of
our privacy,” police did not arrest or charge the operator.26
With the FAA predicting seven million drones in the air in the United States alone
by the year 2020,27 it is critical that states—and indeed the public—recognize the

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Mary Papenfuss, Utah Couple Arrested Over ‘Peeping Tom’ Drone, HUFFPOST (Feb.
17, 2017, 2:51 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/peeping-tom-drone_us
_58a6847fe4b045cd34c03e56 [http://perma.cc/PLB2-CTBA].
19. Utah Couple Arrested for Allegedly Peering into Neighbors’ Windows with Drone,
FOX NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/16/utah-couple-arrested
-for-allegedly-peering-into-neighbors-windows-with-drone.html
[https://perma.cc/SW3W
-KJXU].
20. Id.
21. Papenfuss, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Lee County Dad Says He Caught Drone Spying on His Kids, NBC 2 NEWS (June 12,
2018, 3:52 PM), http://www.nbc-2.com/story/35181363/lee-county-dad-says-he-caught
-drone-spying-on-his-kids [https://perma.cc/S85R-GNKL].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. FAA, YEARS 2016-2036, supra note 7, at 31; Should You Be Allowed to Prevent
Drones From Flying Over Your Property?, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2016, 10:03 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-be-allowed-to-prevent-drones-from-flying-over-your
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significant change soon coming, and the potential for it to affect the personal privacy
of the average citizen. Such technological advancements harken back to Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’ seminal law review article, The Right to Privacy,28
which has been described as arguably the most influential article ever written. 29 In
1890, Warren and Brandeis lamented the invention of cameras with the ability to take
“instantaneous photographs”30 and the ability of those cameras to invade “the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life.”31 Warren and Brandeis concerned themselves
with the “numerous mechanical devices [that] threaten to make good the prediction
that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”32
Although there have been many articles focused on the government’s use of
drones, this Article will focus on the private, nongovernmental use of drones; that is,
drones that are not used by military or law enforcement. Moreover, the Article will
focus on what portends to be the ubiquitous use of drones by private individuals and
the concomitant ramifications on the privacy of others. More specifically, it will
address how the common law invasion of privacy intrusion upon seclusion tort is not
sufficient to account for drone technology and suggests that more states should be
crafting statutes to address the invasion of privacy claims that are undoubtedly
looming.

-property-1463968981 [https://perma.cc/YJ73-RDMB] (the number of sales of unmanned
aerial vehicles is expected to increase from 2.5 million in 2016 to 7 million in 2020).
28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1; see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 16–21 (2018 ed.).
29. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 3 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (stating that Warren and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy is
the “most influential law review article of all”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28, at 16–21;
Prosser, supra note 2, at 383; Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis
Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 481 (1990) (“It is likely that The Right to Privacy has had as much impact
on the development of law as any single publication in legal periodicals.”).
30. The “instantaneous photographs” refers to advances in photography that took place in
the 1880s that allowed for an individual to take snapshots. Prior to this point, it would take
several minutes to take a photograph, with the individual sitting still the entire time. RICHARD
C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (2d ed. 2002);
see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 336, 338 (1967). The telephone,
microphone, and digital recorder, with ability to tap telephone lines were also
invented/developed in the later decades of the nineteenth century. TURKINGTON & ALLEN,
supra, at 45.
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
32. Id. Warren and Brandeis’ seminal privacy article was undoubtedly influenced by
changes in technology in the late nineteenth century:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which
must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual
what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone.” Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.”
Id. (internal citations omitted); see TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 30, at 45.
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Part I explores the background on drones, including their features, longevity,
prices, availability, and advancements, drones are becoming more commonplace for
private and commercial uses. Part II explores the history of the right to privacy and
specifically the privacy tort of inclusion upon seclusion. This Part also addresses the
FAA and the current regulations for drones for both recreational and commercial use.
Part III discusses the right to privacy and drones: how the statutory schemes for civil
and criminal liability have addressed drones and how common-law privacy torts
affect the brave new world of drones. Finally, Part IV identifies the practical hurdles
for prosecuting drone-related privacy torts and recommends that courts consider the
extent of technology used by drone operators.
I. BACKGROUND ON DRONES
Drones are astonishing technological advancements in themselves, but their
capabilities also make them irresistible to the military and police, companies, and the
everyday citizen. This small, flying technology platform can reach new heights and
limits physically, but can also record a vast amount of information/data through
photography, video, and sensors, including location information, audio, thermal
imaging, facial recognition, night vision, and data interception.33 These capabilities
have greatly expanded with each model and technological advancement 34 and the
sheer number of drones available and in use today surpassed predictions.35
Technologically, drones continue to break new barriers. For example, they can
utilize license plate readers and sensors to allow them to recognize a license plate
and then conduct surveillance on the vehicle with that license plate.36 New

33. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES 3–4 (2013) (observing that drones may be equipped with “high-powered cameras,
thermal imaging devices, license plate readers, and laser radar (LADAR)” (internal citations
omitted)).
34. Drone technology has increased dramatically in recent years. Specifically, drones can
travel farther, both in distance and in height, stay aloft for longer periods of time, and are more
accessible and advantageous to individual and commercial use. See, e.g., Michael Calvo,
Uncertainty and Innovation: The Need for Effective Regulations to Foster Successful
Integration of Personal and Commercial Drones, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 189, 193–94 (2016)
(“Drones can be found in a number of civilian sectors such as journalism, scientific research,
agriculture, and surveillance. Because of how they are designed, their variations in size, and
their almost limitless capabilities, drone technology has virtually presented this generation
with a twenty-first century new-age equivalent of the Swiss-Army Knife.” (footnotes
omitted)); Andy Linn, Comment, Agriculture Sector Poised to Soar with Drone Integration,
but Federal Regulation May Ground the Industry Before It Can Take Off, 48 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 975, 977 (2016) (discussing drone use in the agricultural industry).
35. FAA, YEARS 2016–2036, supra note 7, at 31.
36. Although drones can be equipped with thermal imaging devices, facial recognition
technology, high powered cameras, and laser radar, all at a relatively low cost, given the
increases in surveillance technology generally, the surveillance capabilities are likely to
increase exponentially. ANNA T. MCKENNA & CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING IN THE INTERNET AGE (3d ed. 2007).
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technology is being developed to help drones land like birds, allowing drones with
wings to land with less runway space.37
Sensor platforms on drones also continue to become more sophisticated,
increasing their ability to conduct a variety of different types of surveillance.
Multispectral sensors are used to capture unseen information as well as to advance
agricultural sciences.38 Drones are being developed to utilize processing and
decision-making technology to be more nimble and adaptable to changing
surroundings.39 Drones may carry platforms that allow live video feeds, infrared
cameras, heat sensors, radar, and Wi-Fi crackers,40 which can spoof, or impersonate,
cell phone towers.41 The United States Air Force has developed sensor platforms that
allow for long-range monitoring using “electro-optical and infrared sensors,” that
may soon be placed in fighter jets, allowing pilots to operate drones. 42
Moreover, private industry is taking notice and embracing drone technology, 43
which will likely lead to even more advances and inevitable tort-law implications.

37. David Hambling, Drones Are Learning to Land Like Birds, POPULAR MECHANICS
(Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones/a25718/drone-bird-ai/
[https://perma.cc/7BGY-4H76]. Drones with wings are likely more power-efficient, which
may allow drones to stay aloft longer and carry more weight. “A more advanced version of
this perching drone could go anywhere with limited landing space, whether dousing fires,
fighting a war, or just delivering a package. It could one day land on your windowsill as easily
and frequently as a pigeon.” Id.
38. See, e.g., Christopher Van Veen, The Eyes Have It… But Not Always, HEADWALL
BLOG (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.headwallphotonics.com/blog/the-eyes-have-it...but-not
-always [https://perma.cc/8QVC-SLQL]; Andrew Zaleski, This California Vineyard Is Using
Drones to Make Better Wine, FORTUNE (Jan. 24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016
/01/24/california-vineyard-drones-wine/ [https://perma.cc/M7XC-WL7W]; see also Clay
Dillow, Get Ready for ‘Drone Nation,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014
/10/08/drone-nation-air-droid/ [http://perma.cc/V7QA-QU74].
39. E.g., April Glaser, Qualcomm’s Latest Technology Allows Drones to Learn About
Their Environment As They Fly, RECODE (Jan. 17, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.recode.net
/2017/1/7/14195076/qualcomm-drones-machine-learning-flight-control-ces-2017
-snapdragon [https://perma.cc/PM6L-WA2S].
40. Wi-Fi crackers are devices that can defeat a local Wi-Fi network security system.
Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillancedrones [https://perma.cc/BY7S-T95N].
41. Id.
42. David Cenciotti & David Axe, This New Drone Sensor Can Scan a Whole City at
Once, MEDIUM: WAR IS BORING (Sept. 9, 2014), https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-new
-sensor-on-this-drone-can-scan-a-whole-city-at-once-33c314d4c763 [https://perma.cc/FR2F
-2KJJ]. While not technically a sensor platform, drones may also be used to carry lethal or
non-lethal payloads such as missiles, tasers, or rubber bullets. Surveillance Drones, supra note
40.
43. A study conducted by the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI), the largest international association for drones, John Villasenor, Observations from
Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y, 457, 466 (2013),
predicted that the drone industry has the potential to be worth over $400 billion in revenue,
and to create 103,776 jobs. Chris Wickham, Military Drones Zero in on $400 Billion Civilian
Market, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/usscience-drones-civilian-idUSBRE8AD1HR20121114 [https://perma.cc/QZ59-JFY2]; see
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Industries such as agriculture, construction, energy, mining, real estate, and film are
showing great interest in drones.44 The oil industry has used “drone-based thermal
imaging and gas ‘sniffer’ technology to inspect oil rigs and pipelines.”45 A security
company is integrating drones into home security systems,46 and the construction
industry is keen to use drones for quicker and more precise surveying and more
efficient deployment of resources on each job site.47 In addition to using sensors, the
agriculture industry is moving towards low- and mid-elevation irrigation systems
using drones, and monitoring and collecting data to improve quality and conditions
of their operations.48 Further, energy companies are planning to deploy drones to
perform dangerous tasks involving power lines, where workplace injury is
common.49
In addition to myriad commercial uses, drones are wildly popular for hobbyists
and recreational users—flying for enjoyment or educational purposes. 50 Users
employ their drones for various purposes, ranging from capturing photos from
various heights and angles, to taking video of their sporting teams to improve play,
and, of course, flying for general enjoyment.51 Users may also be tempted to use

also Matt Sledge, Domestic Drone Lobby Pushes Back on Restrictions, Seeks Tax Breaks,
HUFFPOST (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/13/domestic-drones
_n_2868450.html [https://perma.cc/U4DL-653V]; Los Angeles News Group, Businesses See
Opportunity in Civilian Drones, but Regulations Stand in the Way, DENVER POST (Apr. 29,
2016, 5:32 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23522851/businesses-see-opportunity
-civilian-drones-but-reguations-stand [https://perma.cc/434N-HSF8].
44. Villasenor, supra note 43, at 459 (delineating examples where drones are used for
commercial purposes such as crop spraying, traffic monitoring, and surveying); Richard Best,
8 Sectors That Drones Are Influencing in 2016, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2016),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/021416/8-sectors-drones-are-influencing
-2016.asp [https://perma.cc/PB5A-XADG].
45. Guillaume Thibault & Georges Aoude, Companies Are Turning Drones into a
Competitive Advantage, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 29, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/companies
-are-turning-drones-into-a-competitive-advantage [https://perma.cc/ZXX6-XYT9].
46. Luke Dormehl, Halt! A New Home Security System Deploys a Drone to Patrol Your
Property, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 5, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool
-tech/sunflower-home-awareness-system/ [https://perma.cc/JB9U-Q89F].
47. Clay Dillow, The Construction Industry Is in Love with Drones, FORTUNE (Sept. 13,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/commercial-drone-construction-industry/ [https://
perma.cc/2VAC-UVF6].
48. Logan Hawkes, Drone Use in Agriculture Expected to Grow Quickly, SW. FARMPRESS
(Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.southwestfarmpress.com/technology/drone-use-agriculture
-expected-grow-quickly [https://perma.cc/EVF2-VULE].
49. Aaron Gregg, This Drone Operator is Helping Power Companies Mechanize Their
Most Dangerous Jobs, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/capital-business/wp/2017/02/07/this-drone-operator-is-helping-power-companies
-mechanize-their-most-dangerous-jobs/?utm_term=.03483ca0119f [https://perma.cc/QW8A
-32GD].
50. University of Montana: Autonomous Aerial Systems Office, Hobbyists and
Recreational Users, https://www.umt.edu/aaso/Hobbyist.php [https://perma.cc/K8K5-D539].
51. See Nick Wingfield, A Field Guide to Civilian Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/technology/guide-to-civilian-drones.html
[https://perma.cc/2ECR-WZHB].
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drones for hunting purposes, which six states prohibit, or for interfering with lawful
hunting, which seven states prohibit.52
Moreover, drones provide consumers with relatively inexpensive technology with
which to engage in a variety of tasks.53 Hobbyist drones can be purchased both online
and in brick and mortar locations, with stores like Best Buy, 54 Office Depot,55 and
Walmart offering a variety of drones for purchase. 56 On average, users spend
between $600–$2,500 for a high-quality drone, and most fly for only about twelve
to thirty minutes before needing to be recharged. 57 Less expensive models are
available for only a few hundred dollars; these are typically targeted toward
beginners,58 and can only fly for ten or fewer minutes a charge.59
This booming industry incentivizes companies to develop new and unique drone
technologies and features. However, malfunctions and necessary recalls plague
quick-to-market drones. A leading company, Go-Pro, had to recall a drone just weeks
after going to market because the drones were falling midflight.60 Videos surfaced
online of the crashes, including some crashes showing drones nearly colliding with
passersby, which likely prompted the quick recall by the company. 61
Moreover, as domestic and hobbyist drone use is increasing in popularity, the
likelihood owners and operators may be liable for various tort violations is also

52. 2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) State Legislation Update, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/2016-unmanned
-aircraft-systems-uas-state-legislation-update.aspx [https://perma.cc/MW7X-B3K9].
53. Unmanned aircraft come in all shapes and sizes, have thousands of uses, and can be
purchased by your average person. Divya Joshi, Exploring the Latest Drone Technology for
Commercial, Industrial and Military Drone Uses, BUS. INSIDER (July 13, 2017, 4:40 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/drone-technology-uses-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/7ZMHQGBL].
54. See DJI - Mavic Air Fly More Combo Quadcopter with Remote Controller, BEST BUY,
https://www.bestbuy.com/site/dji-mavic-air-fly-more-combo-quadcopter-with-remote
-controller-onyx-black/6194017.p?skuId=6194017.
55. See DJI Mavic 2 Pro Drone With 4K UHD Camera, OFFICE DEPOT, https://www
.officedepot.com/a/products/9559064/DJI-Mavic-2-Pro-Drone-With/
[https://perma.cc
/MG26-3HDD].
56. See Phantom 3 Professional Quadcopter, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com
/ip/DJI-Phantom-3-Professional-Quadcopter-with-4K-Camera-3-Axis-Gimbal-23-min
-Flight-Time-20-mm-Focal-Length-f-2.8-Lens/45655207 [https://perma.cc/8BML-MHM6].
57. See Jim Fisher, The Best Drones of 2019, PC MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018, 11:08 AM),
https://www.pcmag.com/roundup/337251/the-best-drones [https://perma.cc/4KAT-N7N9].
58. Id. Interestingly, see Justice Powell’s dissent in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 251 n.13 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) observing that “members of the public”
were not likely to use the surveillance technology at issue due to the cost.
59. See 17 Cheap Drones for Beginners (Under $180): Updated with New Drone Models
for 2018, UAV COACH, https://uavcoach.com/cheap-drones-for-beginners/ [https://perma
.cc/UW8J-6PPM].
60. Sean O’Kane, GoPro’s Karma Drone is Back on Sale, Three Months After Recall,
VERGE (Feb. 1, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/2/1/14458974/gopro
-karma-sale-relaunch-recall-crash [https://perma.cc/4TMG-5DCC].
61. Sean O’Kane, Watch GoPro Karma Drones Fall Out of the Sky, VERGE (Nov. 10,
2016, 2:24 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/10/13588396/gopro-karma-drone-recall
-defect-shut-off-falling-video [https://perma.cc/Z3SZ-T6W4].
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rising. Perhaps mindful of the increasing potential for litigation, in 2015, the FAA
unveiled a web-based drone registration process for owners of small drones
“weighing more than 0.55 pounds . . . and less than 55 pounds . . . including payloads
such as on-board cameras.”62 The registration process is focused primarily on
facilitating the FAA’s ability to identify and keep track of the thousands of drones
currently in use.63 To register, owners must provide their names, home address, and
email address, and then the website will generate a Certificate of Aircraft
Registration/Proof of Ownership coupled with a unique identification number that
must be marked on the drone.64 In May 2016, the FAA released a database of the
city, state, and zip code of each registered drone owner. 65 As of January 2017, over
670,000 drones were registered in the United States.66
While regulations requiring registration do provide some modicum of
transparency regarding drone ownership, they are equally as notable for what they
fail to provide or require. For example, if the drone is of such a size that there is no
room for the unique identification number to be marked on the outside, the
identification number may instead be placed on the inside of the battery compartment
so long as “it doesn’t require a tool to open.”67 Similarly, while owners are required
to provide their names, addresses, and contact information to the FAA, the only
information provided in the database is their city, state, and zip code.68 While this
undoubtedly protects the privacy of the drone owner, the database does little to
provide transparency to the average citizen who suspects a drone user is potentially
invading his privacy.

62. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Announces Small UAS Registration Fee
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=19856
[hereinafter FAA, Registration Fee] [https://perma.cc/5ZMB-2AHP].
63. See Cecilia Kang, Drone Shopping? F.A.A. Rules May Hover Over the Holidays, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/technology/proposed
-regulations-for-drones-are-released.html [https://perma.cc/EN43-9DZA].
64. FAA, Registration Fee, supra note 62.
65. FAA Releases Drone Registration Location Data, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (July 1,
2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=85548 [https://perma.cc/6B8Z
-Y456].
66. Jonathan Vanian, Drone Registrations Are Still Soaring, FORTUNE (Jan. 7, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/01/06/drones-registrations-soaring-faa/
[https://perma.cc/C3VD
-PHZ6].
67. How to Label Your UAS, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas
/getting_started/register_drone/media/UAS_how_to_label_Infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4K6A-KA34]. 14 C.F.R. § 48.205 (2018) states that the identifier must be “legible,” affixed
by any means necessary to remain affixed throughout the duration of the flight, and must be
“readily accessible and visible upon inspection . . . . A unique identifier enclosed in a
compartment is readily accessible if it can be accessed without the use of any tool.” The FAA
allows operators to mark their UAS with their registration number by engraving, using a
permanent label, or a permanent marker. How to Label Your UAS, supra.
68. FAA Releases Drone Registration Location Data, supra note 65.
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A. Drones and Longevity
In addition to their increasing numbers, modern drones can travel farther, both in
distance and in height, and stay aloft for longer periods of time. 69 Depending on the
combination of amenities, drones can now stay in the air for several hours, days, and
soon indefinitely. For example, a drone carrying up to eleven pounds can travel at
approximately sixty-two miles per hour for up to an hour.70 The current world record
for longest duration of an unmanned aircraft is a solar-powered drone that stayed
aloft for fourteen days and twenty-two minutes.71 Other companies are attempting to
increase the time a drone can stay aloft by utilizing liquid hydrogen and even wireless
charging.72 Moreover, development has started on drones to enable them to remain
airborne for years, potentially acting as a distribution location for companies’
delivery-service drones.73 Technology advancements to increase the time a drone can
stay aloft have been sparked mainly by military needs and private companies’ desire

69. S. Alex Spelman, Note, Drones: Updating the Fourth Amendment and the
Technological Trespass Doctrine, 16 NEV. L.J. 373, 411–12 (2015) (“[C]urrent drone
technology typically operates aloft only for a matter of hours, but certain UAS devices, called
high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAS, will have the potential to operate in the air for
extremely prolonged periods of time (even years), which will enable them to gather long-term
information about the ground, including constitutionally protected areas such as our backyards
and other parts of the curtilage.”); see Shane Crotty, Note, The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing
Need for Fourth Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 227 (2014) (citing the time
periods various drones can stay aloft: “Drones are also capable of staying airborne for long
periods of time, several in excess of twenty-four hours.”); William C. Marra & Sonia K.
McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1169 (2013) (describing various military drones and how long
each can stay afloat); Melanie Reid, Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs
Regulation Not Elimination, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–9 (2014) (describing various drones
and how long they can stay in the air).
70. Nick Heath, The Long-Range Drone That Can Keep Up with a Car and Fly for an
Hour, TECHREPUBLIC (May 27, 2015, 7:31 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/European
-technology/the-long-range-drone-that-can-keep-up-with-a-car-and-fly-for-an-hour/ [https://
perma.cc/K3GF-U9N9].
71. Longest Flight by Solar-powered Spyplane (UAV), GUINNESS WORLD RECORDS (July
23, 2009), http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/longest-flight-by-solar
-powered-spyplane-(uav) [https://perma.cc/5HWA-KEGD]. Another type of drone, a vertical
takeoff and landing drone, stayed aloft for “a total flight time of 22 hours, 29 minutes, and 38
seconds, with fuel to spare.” Latitude Engineering HQ-60 UAV Sets New Flight Record, AERO
NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id
=22ad959f-d3fa-4b4e-8914-e9e10e3df8f1 [https://perma.cc/4U89-7CFU].
72. See Allison Barrie, Enormous Phantom Eye Drone Can Stay Aloft for 4 Days, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/06/06/enormous-phantom-eye
-drone-can-stay-aloft-4-days/ [https://perma.cc/64K5-NRBA]; Colin Smith, Flying Drones
Could Soon Re-Charge Whilst Airborne with New Technology, IMPERIAL C. LONDON (Oct. 20,
2016),
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/newsandeventspggrp/imperialcollege/newssummary
/news_17-10-2016-13-48-58 [https://perma.cc/F3DE-V65B].
73. A 2016 patent owned by Amazon seeks to create an “[a]irborne fulfillment center
utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles for item delivery.” U.S. Patent No. 9,305,280 (filed Dec.
22, 2014).
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to use drones for delivery services. Recently, a new record was set in long-distance
drone delivery when a drone traveled ninety-seven miles from a central urban Texas
location to Austin, Texas.74
While this longevity technology seems inevitable, existing commercially
available drones can only stay in the air for approximately 20–30 minutes at a time.75
Furthermore, a drone’s battery life and flight time are not always synonymous. For
example, one commercially available drone has a battery life of 50–70 minutes, but
can only stay in the air for roughly 6–8 minutes at a time.76 Notwithstanding these
current limitations, companies are developing commercial drones that may run on
gasoline or more advanced batteries for longer flight times. 77 Hydrogen gas-fueled
drones are also in the works, which could allow for commercial drones to fly for up
to four hours at a time. 78 And while the average citizen will probably not be able to
afford drones with a battery life of more than an hour any time soon, advancing
technology may eventually bring even these long-flying drones into the hands of
consumers.
Another technological advancement increasing how long a drone can stay aloft is
the integration of solar panels.79 Solar panels can be placed on fixed-wing drones,

74. Record Set for Longest Drone Urban Package Delivery in the U.S., AERO NEWS
NETWORK (May 12, 2017), http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id
=17ef8dd8-a68b-483f-8c83-684dc6b1d3e9 [https://perma.cc/J2V9-ZZJQ]. This mission was
especially noteworthy because the drone maintained cellular connectivity throughout the
flight, which is a concern in the success of long-distance delivery services. Id.
75. See Douglas James, 14 Drones with the Best Flight Times [Professional and Hobby
Grade], DRONES GLOBE (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.dronesglobe.com/guide/long-flight-time/
[https://perma.cc/Z6WW-X269]; 5 Longest Flight Time Drones to Buy in 2016, TDS, http://
www.topdronesforsale.org/longest-flight-time-drones/ [https://perma.cc/8YKA-D4RT].
76. See Jonathan, 10 Drones with the Best Flight Times [From $30 to $3000], DRONES
GLOBE (Mar. 2, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160512175640/http://www
.dronesglobe.com:80/guide/long-flight-time [https://perma.cc/GM9T-UGVW].
77. Michael Belfiore, Hybrid Power Could Let Drones Fly for Hours, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones/a14804/top
-flight-hybrid-drones/ [https://perma.cc/2TW8-VCS4]; see also Nidhi Goyal, New Solar
Powered Drones Will Remain Airborne for Years, INDUSTRY TAP (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://industrytap.com/new-solar-pwered-drones-will-remain-airborne-for-years/12492
[https://perma.cc/T3ZJ-QWFQ]. (describing how the Solara 50 has thousands of solar cells on
its upper wing surface, enabling it to collect enough solar energy during the day to charge its
batteries at night, allowing it to stay in the air for as long as five years).
78. Ben Coxworth, Hydrogen-Powered Hycopter Quadcopter Could Fly for 4 Hours at a
Time, NEW ATLAS (May 19, 2015), https://newatlas.com/horizon-energy-systems-hycopterfuel-cell-drone/37585/ [https://perma.cc/8N28-JQN5].
79. The flight time of a drone with solar panels varies greatly on the weather and other
relevant conditions. Calm and sunny weather are the optimum conditions for a solar-powered
drone, and the endurance period can lower dramatically with increased winds and unfavorable
weather. See Alan Phillips, Solar Powered UAV Sets New Endurance Record with 81 Hour
Flight, DRONE LIFE (July 29, 2015), http://dronelife.com/2015/07/29/solar-powered-uav-sets
-new-endurance-record-with-81-hour-flight/ [https://perma.cc/L2ZS-AEFY].
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which are typically used for land management, and topographical and mapping
surveys.80 As one of the leading solar companies has noted:
Although rotary wing UAVs allow precise maneuvering, fixed wing
UAVs are more efficient in flight, can carry greater payloads such as
sensors for longer on less power and are better suited for high-altitude
and long endurance (HALE) missions. Fixed wing UAVs can benefit
immensely from thin, lightweight and highly efficient solar cell
technologies available today.81
Companies that use drone technology are similarly interested in drones with
potentially indefinite flight time. For example, Google is currently trying to
implement 5G connectivity on solar-powered drones.82 This technology would
provide numerous benefits including constant GPS capabilities, and providing 5G
connectivity to areas that may not have such a connection. 83 Additionally, mobile
video surveillance would be able to be conducted without human support. 84
Similarly, Amazon’s attempt to provide customers with thirty-minute deliveries via
drones is sparking the demand for drones with longer endurance periods.85
Other companies are using different technology to keep drones aloft indefinitely.
For example, a company called CyPhy has developed a drone called Parc that is
powered from the ground, and absent an interruption with this power, it can stay in

80. ALTADEVICES, SELECTING SOLAR TECHNOLOGY FOR FIXED WING UAVS 2 (2015),
https://www.altadevices.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/selecting-solar-for-uavs
-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U86-7P9F].
81. Id. at 1.
82. Joon Ian Wong, Google’s Reportedly Using Experimental Tech to Deliver 5G Internet
from Solar-Powered Drones, QUARTZ (Feb. 1, 2016), http://qz.com/607042/googles
-reportedly-using-experimental-tech-to-deliver-5g-internet-from-solar-powered-drones/
[https://perma.cc/59W7-BG6M].
83. NEXT GENERATION MOBILE NETWORKS, A DELIVERABLE BY THE NGMN ALLIANCE:
NGMN 5G WHITE PAPER 18, 25 (2015), https://www.ngmn.org/fileadmin/ngmn/content
/downloads/Technical/2015/NGMN_5G_White_Paper_V1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9HU
-77Q7].
84. Id. at 15.
In the coming years, mobile video surveillance may evolve to be available on
aircrafts, drones, cars, and safety and security personnel for monitoring
houses/buildings, targeted areas, special events, etc. These applications will
leverage automated analysis of the video footage, not requiring human support.
While they will not present constraints on the battery life and often use
medium/high-end devices, these applications require a highly reliable and secure
network with the right performance and instant interaction with back-end and
remote systems.
Id. at 16.
85. Brian Sullivan, Look! Up in the Sky!: Courts Must Decide Whether New High-Tech
Toys Can Also Be Targets, 102 ABA J. 71, 71 (Mar. 2016) (“Online retailer Amazon has
announced its intention to begin making 30-minute deliveries via drones.”).
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the air as long as the user wants.86 This drone uses an Ethernet connection to transmit
data and maintain power in the air.87 More specifically,
The PARC system provides high quality, full frame rate, unbroken, High
Definition video that no other small or micro UAS can match. The PARC
system can accept power input from a variety of ac and dc sources,
making it viable for many applications. And because the PARC vehicle
is powered from the ground, the flight duration is not limited by battery
life. In the event of a power interruption or microfilament failure, the
PARC vehicle has an on-board backup battery that will allow the vehicle
to safely and autonomously return to its launch site.88
According to a press release by the company, the United States Army has recently
placed an order for the PARC drones.89
Other companies have designed high endurance drones specifically for military
purposes.90 Israel Aerospace Industries designed a drone that can stay afloat for fortyfive hours called the Heron. 91 AeroVironment has a developed a liquid hydrogenfueled drone that can stay up in the air for five days, or 168 hours.92 ADCOM
Systems has drones that can stay aloft for 120 hours at a time. 93 General Atomics
Aeronautical designed one of the most used and famous drones for military use; it
has a maximum altitude of 50,000 feet and can stay in the air for twenty-seven
hours.94 These long-endurance drones are regularly used to track targets for extended

86. Parc, CYPHY, http://cyphyworks.com/parc/ [https://perma.cc/A6Q9-8NTY].
87. Chloe Olewitz, Thanks to an Ultralight Power Tether, This Surveillance Drone Can
Stay Aloft Forever, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 10, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.digitaltrends
.com/cool-tech/eyes-in-air-perpetual-flight-surveillance-drone-never-lands/ [https://perma.cc
/8SUY-EJJR].
88. This Drone Measures Flight Time in Days Not Minutes, DRONEVIBES (Feb. 14, 2016),
https://www.dronevibes.com/2016/02/14/this-drone-measures-flight-time-in-days-not
-minutes/ [https://perma.cc/76RL-GQD4].
89. Press Release, CyPhy, CyPhy Works Tethered Drone Ordered by the Army, (July 18,
2016), http://cyphyworks.com/news/2016/7/18/cyphy-works-tethered-drone-ordered-by-the
-army [https://perma.cc/M4RA-L2LW].
90. Michael W. Lewis & Emily Crawford, Drones and Distinction: How IHL Encouraged
the Rise of Drones, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1127, 1153–54 (2013) (“Drones’ exceptional endurance
of approximately between twenty and thirty hours allowed for long loiter times over the target,
which helped to accurately identify individual targets as well as to establish their patterns of
movement.”).
91. Praveen Duddu, The 10 Longest Ranged Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
AIRFORCE TECH. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featurethe
-top-10-longest-range-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-uavs/ [https://perma.cc/RDY6-BR4P].
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. PREDATOR B: PERSISTENT MULTI-MISSION ISR, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL
(2015),
http://www.ga-asi.com/Websites/gaasi/images/products/aircraft_systems/pdf
/Predator_B021915.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM5C-KJU6]. Different variations of this drone can
stay aloft for up to forty-two hours. Predator B RPA, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL,
http://www.ga-asi.com/predator-b [https://perma.cc/K8LM-8SF2]; Michael W. Lewis,
Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 296–97 (2012)
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periods of time. “A couple of drones can follow a potential target for days or even
weeks at a time to create a ‘pattern of life’ analysis that assists in determining whether
the target is engaged in hostile activities.”95
In sum, the uses for drone technology are increasing in response to the amount of
time a drone can stay aloft. From land management to military surveillance, drone
technology affords individuals the ability to observe and utilize other technologies
more easily, cheaply, and for longer periods of time. 96 In addition to their productive
and benign uses, however, many of these technological advances and developments
will increase the ability of drones to engage in surreptitious surveillance. For
example, with “perch and stare” surveillance, a dronr secures itself to a stationary
vantage point and then powers down the propulsion mechanism. 97 In doing so, the
“persistence of surveillance” can be greatly extended because lack of movement

(“Operationally, drones provide a couple of significant advantages over manned aircraft that
make them particularly valuable in certain types of modern armed conflicts. Their biggest
advantage is their very long endurance: over thirty hours for the Predator B and twenty hours
for the Predator C (Avenger).”).
95. Michael W. Lewis, Clearing the Air: The Real Reason Why Drones are the Weapon
of Choice in Counterterrorism and Why that is a Good Thing for Civilians, 14 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 2013, at 50, 50.
96. Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 354, 406 (2016). The abstract of the article states:
For the first time in American history a regulatory regime is about to allow
for small aircraft without onboard pilots—drones—to fly in the national airspace.
Legal and technological developments have thus made it all but certain that
drones will be a catalyst for new ways of thinking about privacy and surveillance
. . . . Thus, the battle over privacy and aerial surveillance will be fought in
statehouses throughout the country. This Article seeks to frame future
discussions about how states will handle the privacy issues associated with aerial
surveillance.
The Article takes the counterintuitive position that technology has the
potential to make unmanned aerial surveillance more protective of privacy than
manned surveillance. It further argues that scholars and legislators should move
beyond a warrant-based, technology centric approach to protecting privacy from
aerial surveillance. Such an approach is unworkable, counterproductive, and may
stifle efforts to enact more privacy protective legislative regimes. Instead, this
Article proposes that legal reforms should focus on excluding low altitude flights
and surveillance coupled with imposing limits on persistent surveillance,
requiring enhanced accountability procedures for data retention and access, and
creating new transparency, accountability and oversight measures.
Id. at 354.
97. Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 86
(2012).
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increases battery life.98 The drones utilizing perch and stare surveillance may be
equipped with acoustical eavesdropping devices or laser optical microphones. 99
Because of their various sizes and altitude capacity, drones can fly undetected
through a variety of environments. There are drones, for example, which have a
wingspan of over 130 feet and weigh sixteen tons.100 There are also drones the size
of insects,101 or hummingbirds,102 which can move about unobserved. It is these
smaller drones with the potential to fly undetected for long periods of time and mask
their appearance that pose some of the largest threats to individual privacy.
Potential privacy concerns also increase once these drones are equipped with
high-resolution cameras so that they can show detail imaging of “high resolution
picture and video, peering inside high level windows, and through solid barriers, such
as fences, trees, and even walls.”103 Moreover, given that the pictures and video from
these high resolution cameras can be transmitted in real time to the individual
controlling the drone, the potential for intrusion of privacy becomes significantly
greater.104
The ever-advancing capabilities in drones along with the technology equipped to
them implicate privacy concerns.105 As I discuss in the next Section, the current FAA
regulations and federal law fail to protect citizens from the inevitable privacy
intrusions when more drones take flight.

98. Id.; see also Jonathan Olivito, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Limiting Drone
Surveillance Through the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 669,
677 n.52 (2013) (noting that the “concept behind ‘perch-and-stare’ surveillance is to ‘avoid
energy-intensive moving or hovering flight by securing itself to a vantage point and turning
off its propulsion mechanism.’” (quoting Takahashi, supra note 97, at 86)).
99. Olivito, supra note 98, at 677; see also Takahashi, supra note 97, at 88 (“Acoustical
systems function by day and by night while laser systems function on wavelengths not easily
visible to humans. No physical trespass is necessary to record the sounds from inside a
structure. The usable range of these devices may approach 1000 feet . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)).
100. RQ-4 Global Hawk, U.S. AIR FORCE (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.af.mil/About
-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk/ [https://perma.cc/328Q-MGAK].
101. THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 2.
102. Philip J. Hiltner, Comment, The Drones Are Coming: Use of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles for Police Surveillance and Its Fourth Amendment Implications, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L.
& POL’Y 397, 400–01 (2013) (exploring numerous UAS capabilities); see also John Van
Geffen, Unmanned and Unafraid—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the National Airspace
System, UPCOUNSEL BLOG (Nov. 11, 2013), http://blog.upcounsel.com/unmanned-and
-unafraid-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-in-the-national-airspace-system [https://perma.cc/EMD2
-AQNQ].
103. EPIC v. FAA: Challenging the FAA’s Failure to Establish Drone Privacy Rules,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones [https://
perma.cc/E5SZ-6JCQ].
104. Villasenor, supra note 43, at 464.
105. “Drone technology is developing so quickly—and morphing into commercial uses
never before contemplated—that aviation regulators are having trouble keeping pace.” Andy
Pasztor & Robert Wall, Drone Regulators Struggle to Keep Up with the Rapidly Growing
Technology, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2016, 7:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/drone
-regulators-struggle-to-keep-up-with-the-rapidly-growing-technology-1468202371 [https://
perma.cc/7PCJ-NRE8].
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B. UAV Regulation
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was first established by Congress in
1958 as part of the Federal Aviation Act. 106 The primary purpose of the FAA was to
provide safe, efficient use of the national airspace by civilian aircraft. 107 In
accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act
(FMRA), in 2012, Congress mandated the FAA to regulate aircraft operations
conducted in the National Air Space108 and to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce.109 Moreover, Congress defined “aircraft” as “any contrivance
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”110 According to FAA
guidance, because a drone is a “contrivance/device that is invented, used, and
designed to fly in the air, it meets the definition of ‘aircraft’”111 and is therefore
subject to FMRA’s mandate.
The FAA’s existing drone regulations vary based on the user’s purpose: for
recreation or for work. 112 Recreational operators must follow certain requirements
and are limited in how they can utilize their drone. Regulations classify most
recreational drones as model aircrafts. A drone is considered a model aircraft if it is
“capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere[; it i]s flown within visual line-of-sight
of the person operating it[; and it i]s flown for hobby or recreational purposes.”113
Further, to be registered for recreational purposes, the drone must weigh less than
fifty-five pounds.114 The operator must register as a “modeler” and mark the drone
with the registration number.115

106. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (current version at
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552).
107. “Our continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in
the world.” Mission, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Apr. 23, 2010, 9:37 AM), https://www.faa.gov
/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/UUF9-YQTP]; see also A Brief History of the FAA, FED.
AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM), http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief
_history/#origins [https://perma.cc/TRC3-E7KF].
108. 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012). The National Air Space is “[t]he common network of U.S.
airspace; air navigation facilities, equipment and services, airports or landing areas . . . .
Included are system components shared jointly with the military.” FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
PILOT/CONTROLLER GLOSSARY PCG N-1 (2014), https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications
/media/pcg_4-03-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS42-7PTV].
109. 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2012); see also Olivito, supra note 98, at 671.
110. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2012).
111. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUSPECTED
UNAUTHORIZED UAS OPERATIONS 2 (2016).
112. Getting Started, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Oct. 18, 2018, 4:38 PM),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/ [https://perma.cc/JS42-7PTV].
113. Frequently Asked Questions: Is a UAS the Same As a Model Aircraft?, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN. (Dec. 10, 2018, 11:28 AM), https://faa.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/737
/kw/General%20UAS%20or%20Drone%20Questions [https://perma.cc/J7ZH-UTAQ].
114. FAA Drone Zone, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://faadronezone.faa.gov/#
[https://perma.cc/B95L-397Y].
115. See Recreational Fliers & Modeler Community-Based Organizations, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN. (Dec. 12, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/model_aircraft/
[https://perma.cc/GH3D-3MLL].

1082

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:1065

In an effort to assist hobbyist and recreational drone users, the FAA released an
application called B4UFLY.116 “B4UFLY is a free, easy-to-use smartphone app that
helps drone operators learn where they can and can’t fly.”117 The application
purportedly updates in real time, showing permanent flight restriction locations and
temporary restrictions over wildfires. 118 However, the application is voluntary, and
while the FAA encourages users to send their flight information through the
application, there is no requirement to do so.119
While the FAA attempted to regulate domestic drone use by implementing this
registration process, the D.C. Circuit Court created a major roadblock by striking
down the FAA’s rule requiring model aircrafts to be registered. 120 The court found
that under FRMA, the FAA may not promulgate any rule regarding model
aircrafts.121 As the court stated, “the Registration Rule is unlawful to the extent that
it applies to model aircraft.”122
Approximately every three months, the FAA releases updated sighting reports,
averaging about 100 reports of sightings a month.123 Many of the sightings include
drones flying in restricted areas like near airports, and these users may be subject to
fines and criminal charges by the FAA.124 While this data may be helpful in assisting
the FAA or local officials in holding these users accountable, most of the reports are
made by pilots or other individuals involved in an air-space-related career, with little
detail, and likely not immediately.125
Moreover, operators using drones for commercial purposes must conform to other
requirements. Drones not registered as model aircrafts, must be registered under 14
C.F.R. part 107 (“part 107”).126 Pursuant to part 107, the drone must weigh less than
55 pounds, fly at or below 400 feet, fly at or under 100 mph, remain within visual
line of sight, and may not fly directly over people or be flown out of a moving
vehicle.127 In June 2016, the FAA released operational rules for “routine commercial

116. B4UFLY Mobile App, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:51 AM),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/b4ufly/ [https://perma.cc/2SGD-GEWE].
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. B4UFLY General Questions & Answers, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa
.gov/uas/recreational_fliers/where_can_i_fly/b4ufly/media/UAS_B4UFLY_QandA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NA6Z-2ZXF].
120. Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
121. Id.; see FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, 126 Stat.
11, 77 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
122. Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092.
123. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., UAS SIGHTINGS REPORT (2018), https://www.faa.gov/uas
/resources/public_records/uas_sightings_report/ [https://perma.cc/TZ36-VXW9].
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., REPORTED UAS SIGHTINGS (JULY 2016-SEPT. 2016)
(2017).
126. Certificated Remote Pilots Including Commercial Operators, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.
(Dec. 18, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/part_107/ [https://perma
.cc/A4NJ-A5AA].
127. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107)
(2016) https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8ZB
-765D].
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use of small” drones.128 These rules “are designed to minimize risks to other aircraft
and people and property on the ground.”129 The rules require the operator of the drone
to have a “remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating.” 130
One of the major impediments to the use of drones is the complicated legal
balance between FAA regulations and state laws. While the FAA’s control of
registration, location restrictions, and restrictions related to safety may reign supreme
over state laws, states are tasked with creating laws that protect the nondrone user on
the ground, while not interfering with federal regulations. Significantly, the FAA has
stated that although its rules “[do] not specifically deal with privacy issues in the use
of drones, and the FAA does not regulate how UAS gather data on people or property,
the FAA is acting to address privacy considerations in this area.” 131 It then
encourages “all UAS pilots to check local and state laws before gathering
information through remote sensing technology or photography.” 132 Therefore, until
the FAA explicitly addresses privacy in its regulations, state statutes and common
law will provide the only guidance for privacy causes of action. These laws are
discussed in the next (two) Parts.
II. COMMON LAW TORTS AND PRIVACY
A. A Right to Privacy
Every state now recognizes the common law right to privacy in some fashion. 133
The earliest pronounced discussion of a legal right to privacy by an appellate court
is found in De May v. Roberts,134 where the Michigan Supreme Court granted a
woman’s request for tort relief when, without her consent, the defendant observed
her giving birth to her child.135 The court found that the woman had “a legal right to
the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right by
requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation.”136
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, both private attorneys at the
time, published The Right to Privacy.137 Often considered the most important and
influential article ever published,138 most scholars generally agree that the article

128. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases
/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515 [https://perma.cc/BH7R-63NF].
129. Id.
130. Id. If the operator does not have a certificate, he or she may be “directly supervised
by someone with such a certificate.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 30, at 24–25.
134. Id. at 23.
135. 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
136. Id. at 149.
137. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
138. Kalven, supra note 29, at 327 (Warren and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy is the “most
influential law review article of all.”); Turkington, supra note 29, at 481 (“It is likely that The
Right to Privacy has had as much impact on the development of law as any single publication
in legal periodicals.”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28, at 16–21; Prosser, supra note 2, at
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precipitated the development of common law privacy torts. 139 Prior to the publication
of the article, no English or American court had granted relief expressly based upon
the invasion of privacy.140
In one prescient passage, Warren and Brandeis lamented the invention of cameras
specifically because of the ability to take “instantaneous photographs”141 and thereby
to “invade[] the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”142 Warren and
Brandeis concerned themselves with the “numerous mechanical devices [that]
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”143
Despite widespread recognition of the importance of Warren and Brandeis’
landmark article, a right of action for privacy was not widely recognized 144 in any
state until 1903, when the New York state legislature enacted a statute recognizing a
right to privacy in the use of one’s image:
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within this
state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without . . .
written consent . . . may maintain an equitable action . . . to prevent and
restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use . . . .145
The enactment of the New York state privacy statute was largely in response to
the public condemnation of the New York Court of Appeals’s refusal to recognize
such a tort in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.146 In Roberson, a milling

383.
139. Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 247–48 (1st Cir. 2002) (“It is rare that the pedigree
of a whole breed of common law tort claims can be traced with pinpoint accuracy,” such as in
the case of the privacy torts.).
140. See id. at 247–48 (“But in the case of common law claims for invasion of the right of
privacy, most sources agree that the broad contours of these legal theories were first outlined”
in The Right to Privacy); see also Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y.
1902).
141. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195–96. The “instantaneous photographs” refers
to advances in photography that took place in the 1880s that allowed for an individual to take
snapshots. Prior to this point, it would take several minutes to take a photograph, with the
individual sitting still the entire time. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 30, at 45; WESTIN,
supra note 30, at 338. The telephone, microphone, and digital recorder, with ability to tap
telephone lines were also invented/developed in the later decades of the nineteenth century.
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 30, at 45.
142. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
143. Id.
144. For a brief discussion of the British common law cases relied upon by Brandeis and
Warren in their seminal Privacy article, see Roberson, 64 N.E. at 444–45, 447 (“An
examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that the so-called ‘right of privacy’
has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine
cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law.”).
145. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009).
146. 64 N.E. at 447–48; see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law:
A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1892–93 (2010) (describing the “popular outcry”
against Roberson that lead to the New York State Legislature’s enactment of the right to
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company appropriated a picture of the plaintiff as part of an advertisement for its
flour.147 The milling company printed out twenty-five thousand copies of the
plaintiff’s picture for the advertisement, which it then “conspicuously posted and
displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons, and other public places.”148
The Roberson court divided four to three in its decision not to recognize a cause
of action for the legal right of privacy. 149 Although the majority purportedly based
its opinion on a lack of legal precedent recognizing a right to privacy absent a
property right, Chief Judge Parker, who authored the opinion, implied that the
plaintiff was making too much over the use of her photo, noting:
Such publicity, which some find agreeable, is to plaintiff very distasteful,
and thus, because of defendants’ impertinence in using her picture,
without her consent, for their own business purposes, she has been
caused to suffer mental distress where others would have appreciated the
compliment to their beauty implied in the selection of the picture for such
purposes.150
Judge Gray, on behalf of himself and two other judges, wrote a scathing dissent,
finding the majority’s position that there was no basis for a right to privacy in the
case
an inconceivable one that these defendants may, unauthorizedly, use the
likeness of this young woman upon their advertisement as a method of
attracting widespread public attention to their wares, and that she must
submit to the mortifying notoriety, without right to invoke the exercise
of the preventive power of a court of equity. 151
It is against this backdrop that, two years later, the Supreme Court of Georgia
recognized a common law right of privacy in Pavesvich v. New England Life
Insurance Co.152 Pavesich, the first major court case to recognize a right to
privacy,153 was largely seen as a rebuke of the majority opinion in Roberson. In
Pavesich, the defendant appropriated a picture of the plaintiff for its advertising
campaign, adding a quote to the advertisement stating that plaintiff had bought life
insurance from the defendant.154 Plaintiff had neither consented to the use of his
photo nor had he purchased life insurance from the defendant.155 The court held that

privacy statute); see also Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952)
(stating that as the Roberson case shows, “the statute was born of the need to protect the
individual from selfish, commercial exploitation of his personality”).
147. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 451.
150. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
152. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
153. PETER B KUTNER & OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., ADVANCED TORTS 390 (4th ed.
2013).
154. 50 S.E. at 68.
155. Id.
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publishing an individual’s picture without his consent as part of an advertisement for
a business violated the individual’s right to privacy. 156
In 1960, seventy years after the seminal Warren and Brandeis The Right to
Privacy article,157 Professor William Prosser published a groundbreaking article on
the common law privacy torts.158 Prosser delineated over 300 appellate court cases
addressing tort aspects of privacy law. 159 These cases, however, were primarily
common law cases involving such issues as nuisance, trespass, and the right to be let
alone.160 Prosser sought to categorize the tort claims into four distinct torts each
describing an invasion of a different privacy interest, but otherwise having “almost
nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone.’” 161 He proposed
four separate and distinct torts that were to be considered the “right to privacy”
torts,162 summarized as: “(1) intrusion upon a plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, (2)
appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, (3) public disclosure or
embarrassing of a plaintiff’s private facts, and (4) publicity placing plaintiff in false
light in the public eye.”163 The torts were later codified into the Restatement (Second)
of Torts164 and collectively referred to as “the right to be let alone”: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light; and (4)
appropriation.165
Individuals who believe a drone has violated their “right to be let alone” will most
likely bring an action against the operator for intrusion upon seclusion. Because this
tort does not require a physical intrusion to be actionable166 or actual dissemination
of information, as discussed below, this tort will most commonly apply when a drone
operator interferes with an individual’s privacy rights.

156. Id. See generally Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff’s Name or
Likeness in Advertising, 23 A.L.R.3d 865, 873 (1969) (indexing “cases arising under statutes
which specifically give a person whose name or picture is used for advertising purposes a right
of action for invasion of privacy, as well as cases arising in those jurisdictions where the right
of privacy is recognized as applying to all unauthorized uses of a person’s name or picture”).
157. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
158. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY
27 (3d ed. 2011); Prosser, supra note 2, at 383.
159. Prosser, supra note 2, at 388–89.
160. See id. at 389–92.
161. Id. at 389.
162. Id.
163. Tigran Palyan, Comment, Common Law Privacy in a Not So Common World:
Prospects for the Tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion in Virtual Worlds, 38 SW. L. REV. 167, 171
(2008).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (for which
Prosser acted as reporter).
165. Palyan, supra note 163, at 171.
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The tort
may be committed through “the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical
aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs
windows with binoculars . . . .” Id.
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B. Intrusion upon Seclusion
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B, intrusion into a
plaintiff’s “solitude or seclusion” or “[i]ntrusion upon seclusion” as it has become
more commonly known,167 occurs when “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 168 Section 652B
comment (b) to the Restatement distinguishes those intrusions it describes as
“physical” and those it categorizes as “otherwise.”169
Courts first established liability for invasion of privacy in cases where devices
were installed to listen to private conversations. For example, liability for invasion
of privacy was found when a listening device was placed in a person’s home. 170 On
the other hand, installing a listening device in an area of an employer’s premises
where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy was not actionable. 171 Similarly,
courts have often found liability for intrusion upon seclusion when a hidden camera
has been installed in an individual’s home. This has been the case even when one
spouse has installed a hidden camera into his or her own bedroom to record the other
spouse’s sexual activities in the bedroom. 172

167. All states except North Dakota and Wyoming have recognized the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001);
Palyan, supra note 163, at 180 n.106; see Hougum v. Valley Mem’l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812,
816 (N.D. 1998) (discussing the fact that the Supreme Court of North Dakota had not
determined whether a right to privacy tort exists in North Dakota); Jewell v. N. Big Horn Hosp.
Dist., 953 P.2d 135, 139–140 (Wyo. 1998).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). For example, the
types of intrusions that have been recognized under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion include
“physically invading a person’s home or other private place, eavesdropping by wiretapping or
microphones, peering through windows, persistent telephoning, unauthorized prying into a
bank account, and opening personal mail of another.” Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 90
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d 819, 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987),
reversed on other grounds, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988)). That said, some states have construed
the intrusion upon seclusion tort more narrowly. See Creel v. I.C.E. & Associates, Inc., 771
N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (describing how “Indiana courts have narrowly
construed the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion”).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
170. E.g., Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958) (finding landlord liable for
installing a listening device in tenant’s apartment and listening into conversations). But see
Smith v. Cincinnati Post & Times-Star, 475 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1973); Chaplin v. Nat’l Broad.
Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
171. Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985); Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc.,
341 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. App. 1986) (intrusion not actionable when store employees viewed a
restroom through a ceiling crack because they suspected a customer was engaging in criminal
activity in the restroom). But see Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011) (holding
the installation of camera in an office restroom was actionable, given the heightened
expectation of privacy in a restroom).
172. In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 2008); Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d
350 (N.C. App. 1996).
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Courts have interpreted [Restatement (Second) of Torts] § 652B [as]
requir[ing] a plaintiff to prove (1) an intentional intrusion into a private
place, conversation, or matter (2) in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person. To prevail on the first prong, the plaintiff must show
(a) an actual, subjective expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,
conversation, or matter, and (b) that the expectation was objectively
reasonable.173
Thus, a plaintiff must prove two elements: the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the
plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into
the plaintiff’s room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in
entering his home. It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses,
with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s
private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars
or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of
investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his
private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his
private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit
an inspection of his personal documents. The intrusion itself makes the
defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or other
use of any kind of the photograph or information outlined.174
Moreover, information does not need to be acquired to maintain an intrusion upon
seclusion cause of action.175 In fact, liability for intrusion upon seclusion “has
nothing to do with the content of the information discovered.”176 The interest the
intrusion upon seclusion tort protects is “the right to respite from observation and
judgment so that, when we do participate socially, we can be more engaged and
ethical participants.”177 Therefore, intrusion upon seclusion is “the quintessential
example of a restriction on observation.”178 However, and as discussed in the next
Section, the intrusion upon seclusion tort has been limited in its protection of privacy
by requiring plaintiffs to have an actual subjective expectation of privacy that is also
objectively reasonable.179

173. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812–13, 819 (9th
Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (finding that the “covert videotaping of a business
conversation among strangers in business offices does not rise to the level of an exceptional
prying into another’s private affairs, which the Restatement’s illustrations indicate is required
for ‘offensiveness’”).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
175. Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 1983) (citing cases that
have held that information does not need to be acquired to maintain the cause of action); see
Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 206 (2012).
176. Bambauer, supra note 175.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 209.
179. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812–13 (9th
Cir. 2002); PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995).
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1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
For purposes of the intrusion tort, privacy “must be evaluated with respect to the
identity of the alleged intruder and the nature of the intrusion.” 180 In determining
whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts weigh various
considerations including the location,181 time of day,182 relationship between the
observer and the observed, etc.183 of the intrusion.
Surveillance of an individual in the confines of the individual’s home constitutes
an intrusion upon seclusion cause of action.184 Courts, however, are divided on
whether the mere installation of recording technology in inherently private places
constitutes an intrusion. Some courts have held that, in inherently private places
—one’s bedroom or the restroom—plaintiffs need not prove that a tortfeasor using
technology to intrude actually listened or watched personally for an actionable
claim.185 The mere installation of recording technology constitutes an intrusion in
such intimate places.186 Other courts have held that to establish an intrusion claim,
the defendant must have heard or observed another’s private activities using the
installed technology for an actionable intrusion.187 Additionally, individuals have a

180. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 73 (Cal. 1999).
181. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998) (noting that in
evaluating an intrusion on seclusion claim, the court first asks “whether defendants
‘intentionally intrude[d], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another,’
that is, into a place or conversation private to [the parties]”).
182. Pittman v. J.J. Mac Intyre Co. of Nev., 969 F. Supp. 609, 614 (D. Nev. 1997) (finding
that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy at work during working hours).
183. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (N.C. App. 1996) (finding “a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy might, in some cases, be less for married persons than for
single persons”); see also Shulman, 955 P.2d at 491–92 (“A patient’s conversation with a
provider of medical care in the course of treatment, including emergency treatment, carries a
traditional and legally well-established expectation of privacy.”).
184. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1417–18 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
185. See, e.g., Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011) (finding defendant liable
for installing a camera in an office bathroom provided the camera could have been operated
when plaintiff used the restroom, regardless of whether defendant viewed the camera images
or not); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that proof defendant
observed plaintiffs when defendant had installed see-through panels in ceiling of restroom is
relevant to the question of damages, but it is not fatal to the plaintiff’s case); Hamberger v.
Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964) (finding that the plaintiffs were not required to prove the
defendant overheard or viewed the activities in a secluded place to show an intrusion occurred
when the landlord-defendant installed a recording device in the plaintiffs’ bedroom).
186. Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 184.
187. See, e.g., Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 431 (Pa. 1975) (finding no cause of
action for intrusion upon seclusion because no evidence was presented that anyone had ever
listened to the recorded conversations).
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reasonable expectation of privacy at their place of work as to certain intrusions,188
such as phone calls from debt collectors.189
While individuals generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy from
intrusions into their homes, there is a lesser expectation of privacy from being
observed on one’s property (outside the confines of the home). 190 Moreover, a
successful intrusion upon seclusion claim is less likely when the intrusion occurs in
public. An individual, generally, does not have an expectation of privacy regarding
what is held out in public.191 However, “[a] person does not automatically make
public everything he does merely by being in a public place.”192 Thus, mere
observations in public will not be actionable invasion of privacy, but under certain
circumstances, “overzealous” observations in public may amount to sufficient
intrusions.193 For example, surveillance which aims to frighten or distress a plaintiff,
even if in public, may still be actionable. Furthermore, courts have made clear that
intrusion upon seclusion claims based on photographs or other data collection taken
in “a place open to the general public,” such as photographing an individual walking

188. Kramer v. Downey, 680 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. App. 1984) (finding “the right to
privacy is broad enough to include the right to be free of those willful intrusions into one’s
personal life at home and at work” when defendant followed, sent mail, and entered into “a
pattern of conduct to thrust herself into his presence and otherwise to disrupt his domestic and
professional life”).
189. See, e.g., Pittman v. J.J. Mac Intyre Co. of Nev., 969 F. Supp. 609, 614 (D. Nev. 1997)
(finding an individual “had a reasonable expectation of privacy at her work during the working
hours that arises from a desire to be left alone to perform the duties for which she was hired,”
(quoting Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (D. Nev. 1994))).
190. See, e.g., Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (1990) (finding that a
television broadcast of plaintiff while in his driveway and car was not an intrusion upon
seclusion); McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 347 (Or. 1975) (finding no viable
intrusion upon seclusion claim when a hired private investigator surveilled plaintiff and
trespassed on plaintiff’s property because “[a]ll the surveillance . . . was done during daylight
hours and when plaintiff was exposed to public view by his neighbors and passersby”).
191. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating there is no liability for observing a person, or
even taking his photograph, while he is walking on the public highway, because “he is not
then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye”).
192. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970).
193. Id. (surveilling plaintiff in bank in an “overzealous” manner); see also, e.g., Summers
v. Bailey, 55 F.3d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Traditionally, watching or observing a person
in a public place is not an intrusion upon one’s privacy. However, Georgia courts have held
that surveillance of an individual on public thoroughfares, where such surveillance aims to
frighten or torment a person, is an unreasonable intrusion upon a person’s privacy.”); Stessman
v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687–88 (Iowa 1987) (determining that the
plaintiff stated a claim for intrusion upon her seclusion where defendant videotaped her eating
in a restaurant).

2019]

DRO NE I NVAS I O N

1091

on a public sidewalk or recording license plate numbers of parked cars in a public
lot,194 generally fail.195
In certain situations, however, individuals have been found to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from observations conducted in public. 196 In Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff’s invasion of
privacy suit against a newspaper for publishing a photograph of her in public with
her dress blown up.197 The court stated that “[t]o hold that one who is involuntarily
and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy
merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public scene would be
illogical, wrong, and unjust.”198 But it also noted:
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an
incidental part of that scene in his ordinary status. Where the status he
expects to occupy is changed without his volition to a status
embarrassing to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he
should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to be protected from an
indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right of privacy merely because
misfortune overtakes him in a public place.199
Further, a federal district court in Illinois held that although a prisoner could be
visible from a “publicly visible area,” the prisoner’s invasion of privacy claim against
a news organization for filming him in the prison yard survived a motion to
dismiss.200 The court stated that “[o]f course [the prisoner] could be seen by guards,
prison personnel and inmates, and obviously he was in fact seen by [the defendant’s]
camera operator. But the mere fact a person can be seen by others does not mean that
person cannot legally be ‘secluded.’”201 Although certain privacy intrusions

194. Fogel v. Forbes, 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1084, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (concluding no
privacy claim when couple was photographed while waiting in line at an airport because it was
taken in “a place open to the general public”); see Int’l Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187,
191–92 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio
1983); see also Schifano v. Green Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178 (Ala. 1993)
(dismissing a claim for wrongful intrusion for a photograph taken in the “winner’s circle” at a
track).
195. See, e.g., Fogel, 500 F. Supp. at 1084, 1087.
196. For example, in Kramer v. Downey, the Texas Court of Appeals held that “Although
it has not previously been so held in this State, we now hold that the right to privacy is broad
enough to include the right to be free of those willful intrusions into one’s personal life at
home and at work which occurred in this case.” 680 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. App. 1984)
(holding that woman unwilling to accept the end of an affair followed him and sent items to
his home and maintained “visual contact” of him even though she was always in public) (cited
in Jordan M. Cash, Note, Droning on and on: A Tort Approach to Regulating Hobbyist Drones,
46 U. MEM. L. REV. 695, 727 n.174 (2016)).
197. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
198. Id. at 478.
199. Id.
200. Huskey v. Nat’l. Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (emphasis
added).
201. Id. at 1287–88.
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occurring in public may be actionable, generally a plaintiff will have difficulty
maintaining their privacy tort when the intrusion occurred in public.
But this concept of “what is held out to the public” has exceeded public streets
and buildings as privacy claims where an individual on their own property has been
observed, photographed, or videotaped from a public vantage point are often
dismissed. For example, in McClain v. Boise Cascade Corp., the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected the plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion claim by holding that an
investigator’s trespass onto the plaintiff’s property to film him did not “constitute an
unreasonable surveillance ‘highly offensive to a reasonable man’” because the
plaintiff could have been viewed by the public.202 Similarly, in Aisenson v. American
Broadcasting Co., a California appellate court held there was no intrusion upon
seclusion claim for the broadcasting of a plaintiff while he was in his driveway and
car.203 The Seventh Circuit held in Munson v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors,
that the plaintiff failed to advance evidence of a legitimate expectation of privacy for
the surveillance of the plaintiff on his property that was conducted from public
streets.204
Further, regarding the location or place of the intrusion, states differ in statutory
language and interpretation of intrusion upon seclusion tort claims. For example,
Wisconsin’s statute deviates from the Restatement language by stating one is
protected from intrusion “in a place”205 rather than “upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns.”206 An appellate court in Wisconsin
therefore interpreted the statute to only protect the geographical location, thereby
finding no viable cause of action in one’s medical records file. 207 A federal district
court in Wisconsin found this limited definition unpersuasive, holding that the statute
“does not limit the intrusion to a person’s immediate physical environment but rather
encompasses a person’s private belongings as long as the place these private
belongings are intruded upon is one that a reasonable person would consider
private.”208 Thus, depending on the state’s law, courts around the country reach
different conclusions as to when and where an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy sufficient to establish an intrusion upon seclusion cause of
action.
Depending on the type of intrusion, courts have found that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy from intrusions during certain times of day or

202. 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975). Notably, the court also relied on precedent that one
who seeks damages for alleged injuries “waives his right of privacy to the extent of a
reasonable investigation.” Id.
203. 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that broadcast of plaintiff while in
his driveway and car was not an intrusion upon seclusion).
204. 969 F.2d 266, 271 (7th Cir. 1992).
205. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(2)(a) (West 2018).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
207. Hillman v. Columbia Cty., 474 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); see also
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003) (“The intrusion to which this
refers is into a ‘place’ in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and is not referring
to a body part.”).
208. Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (W.D. Wis.
2002).

2019]

DRO NE I NVAS I O N

1093

while participating in certain activities. For example, in debt collection cases, a
debtor has a reasonable expectation not to be contacted at work by collectors. 209 A
young woman has a reasonable expectation of privacy when giving birth, even
though she originally consented to the intruder’s presence. 210
In addition to an analysis of the timing and nature of an activity, courts also look
to the relationship between the observer and the observed, and this consideration may
greatly diminish the plaintiff’s ability to assert an intrusion upon seclusion cause of
action. For example, in employment contexts, an employee may have a lesser
expectation of privacy from intrusions by their employers because of the practical
and procedural requirements of maintaining a workplace.211 Thus, plaintiffs must
prove their employers intruded into very private places to establish the employer
violated the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.212 Additionally, one may
be deemed to have consented to some intrusion into their private affairs when
involved with litigation and even during processing insurance claims. 213 An

209. See, e.g., Biser v. Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., 211 F. Supp. 3d 845, 858 (S.D. W. Va.
2016) (finding in favor of defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a debt collection case
because “[a]bsent evidence of repeated calls within a short time, calls at inappropriate hours,
offensive language, or any other factor indicating an intent to intrude on the [plaintiff’s]
privacy” the plaintiff’s privacy was not violated). In debt collection cases, courts often look to
the number of phone calls and the time of day the debtor was contacted. Compare Brandt v.
I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-126-T-26MAP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14588, at *12–13 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 19, 2010) (finding 101 calls over a two month period may constitute an invasion of
privacy), with Oppenheim v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (M.D. Fla.
2010) (finding thirty-five to forty debt collection calls over three months were “annoying and
bothersome” but “did not rise to the requisite level of outrageous and unacceptable conduct
contemplated by the tort of invasion of privacy based on intrusion”).
210. De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881) (“To the plaintiff the occasion was
a most sacred one and no one had a right to intrude unless invited or because of some real and
pressing necessity which it is not pretended existed in this case. The plaintiff had a legal right
to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring
others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation.”).
211. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Public
employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”); Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.,
957 F.2d 268, 274–75 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that while “mandatory workplace urine testing
may well be an intrusion that a reasonable person would find objectionable,” the defendant
“did not invade a matter that the plaintiffs had a right to keep private” because it related to the
plaintiff’s employment).
212. Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century
Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 299 (2011); see also Williams v.
City of Tulsa, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1131 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (“Because the Plaintiffs could
not show interference with private affairs in other employees’ offices or in open areas
generally, the Court concludes that the only allegation the Plaintiffs make that could come
within the scope of the tort is that of surveillance in the UCD restroom.”).
213. See, e.g., Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963) (“Thus, by making a
claim for personal injuries appellant must expect reasonable inquiry and investigation to be
made of her claim and to this extent her interest in privacy is circumscribed. It should also be
noted that all of the surveillances took place in the open on public thoroughfares where
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individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy may be outweighed when the subject
of the parties’ litigation justifies an intrusion. For example, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that in a child custody dispute, the father was justified when he
peered through the window of his former wife’s cabin bedroom and took pictures of
her and another woman engaged in sexual conduct for evidence that such a
relationship existed, in an effort to prove that that environment might adversely affect
their child.214
Thus, courts charged with deciding whether a plaintiff bringing an intrusion upon
seclusion claim has a reasonable expectation of privacy must contemplate numerous
considerations with the specific facts before them. Moreover, as discussed in the next
Section, the second element of an intrusion upon seclusion “tort applies a ‘reasonable
person standard’—that is, it tests whether a person of ‘ordinary sensibilities’ would
be offended by the alleged invasion.”215
2. Intrusion that is Highly Offensive to a Reasonable Person
An intrusion occurs “when the defendant performs an act that had the potential to
impair a person’s peace of mind and comfort associated with the expectation of
privacy.”216 Moreover, the intrusion must not only be offensive, but “highly
offensive,” or as one court put it, “outrageously unreasonable conduct.” 217 The
requirement that the conduct be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” requires a
preliminary determination by the court of “offensiveness” to establish if there is
indeed a cause of action for the jury to decide.218 “A court determining the existence
of ‘offensiveness’ would consider the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and
circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and
objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose
privacy is invaded.”219

appellant’s activities could be observed by passers-by. To this extent appellant has exposed
herself to public observation and therefore is not entitled to the same degree of privacy that
she would enjoy within the confines of her own home.” (emphasis added)).
214. Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1039–40 (Miss. 1999).
215. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOMESTIC DRONES AND PRIVACY: A PRIMER 15 (2015),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43965.html [hereinafter CRS, DOMESTIC DRONES
AND PRIVACY] [https://perma.cc/8J6M-34CP]; see also, e.g., Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d
125, 133 (D.D.C. 2001) (stating that the Supreme Court of Ohio described intrusion upon
seclusion as “the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner as to outrage
or to cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”
(quoting Sustin v. Fee, 431 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Ohio 1982)); Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251
F. Supp. 329, 331 (D.S.C. 1966) (stating “the acts complained of must be so gross and out of
line as to offend one of ordinary sensibilities”).
216. Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2011) (citing Hamberger v. Eastman,
206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964)).
217. N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(emphasis added).
218. Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
219. Id. at 679; see also, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1421 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Interference of seclusion must be substantial. 220 Generally, a single incident will
not suffice;221 instead, the intrusion must be “repeated with such persistence and
frequency as to amount to a course of hounding” and “becomes a substantial burden
to his existence . . . .”222 However, a single intrusion may be adequate when the
intrusion is sufficiently outrageous.223 Moreover, the invasion of privacy must be
intentional, meaning the defendant must desire that the intrusion would occur, or, as
with other torts, know with a substantial certainty that such an invasion would result
from his actions.224 An accidental intrusion is not actionable.225 This level of
offensiveness may be equated to the standard required to prove an intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort claim. 226 “Finally, in some states, the intrusion
must cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to permit recovery.”227 These
common-law protections largely stem from theories about and expectations of
privacy that were formed long before the potential for drone technology was
conceived. As discussed in the next Part, the common-law intrusion upon seclusion
tort is simply inadequate to address the potential privacy concerns posed by rapidly
developing drone technology and surveillance. And while states have attempted to
create statutes, these still need work.

220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
221. See, e.g., Haller v. Phillips, 591 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding one
phone call where the caller called the plaintiff a “son of a bitch” did not rise to the level of
intrusion).
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). “Courts
within the Ninth Circuit have held that repeated and continuous calls in an attempt to collect
a debt give rise to a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.” Panahiasl v. Gurney, No. 04-04479
JF, 2007 WL 738642, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (citing cases); see also, e.g., Stonum v.
U.S. Airways, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 894, 905–06 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that an
investigator’s four “innocuous telephone calls over a two-month period” nor plain view
observations would “cause outrage, mental suffering, shame, or humiliation in a person
of ordinary sensibilities”).
223. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that reasonable people could determine that video recording a man being resuscitated
after a seizure in his own bedroom “at a time of vulnerability and confusion” was highly
offensive conduct); Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on an intrusion upon seclusion
claim where the defendant insurance company altered a signed medical release to obtain
private medical information).
224. See O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding lower
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant because there was no dispute of material
fact that the defendant lacked the intention required for plaintiff’s intrusion into seclusion
claim).
225. See id.
226. See, e.g., Stonum v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 894, 905 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(citing Haller v. Phillips, 591 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)).
227. CRS, DOMESTIC DRONES AND PRIVACY, supra note 215, at 15.
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III. RIGHT TO PRIVACY & DRONES
Scholars, legislators, and stakeholders generally agree drone operators may
violate privacy interests, but their opinions vary on how to fix the problem. For
example, Neil Richards and Daniel Solove criticize the rigidity of Prosser’s
classifications of the privacy tort and lament the harm such classification has done,
particularly when it comes to advances in technology where such rigidity cannot keep
up with new developments.228 They charge that Prosser’s categorization “stunted
[privacy law’s] development in ways that have limited its ability to adapt to the
problems of the Information Age.” 229 The question then becomes how should the
common-law legal right of privacy apply in the drone context.
“Given small drones’ dexterity in flight and ability to film inconspicuously, it is
conceivable that drone operators might intrude in a plaintiff’s private affairs in their
attempt to gather information.”230 Currently, Congress and the FAA have remained
silent on implementing laws or regulations aimed at directly protecting individuals’
privacy rights, especially from the peering eyes of nongovernmental drones.
Congressman Edward J. Markey noted in 2012 the grave concerns and need for
privacy safeguards in the age of drones:
Drones are already flying in U.S. airspace – with thousands more to come
– but with no privacy protections or transparency measures in place. We
are entering a brave new world, and just because a company soon will be
able to register a drone license shouldn’t mean that company can turn it
into a cash register by selling consumer information. Currently, there are
no privacy protections or guidelines and no way for the public to know
who is flying drones, where, and why. The time to implement privacy
protections is now. This discussion draft [for the Drone Aircraft Privacy
and Transparency Act of 2012] will help ensure that pilotless aircraft
isn’t privacy-less aircraft and the strongest safeguards are put into place
for Americans.231
In February 2015, President Barack Obama charged the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) with establishing a
“multi-stakeholder engagement process to develop and communicate best practices
for privacy, accountability, and transparency issues regarding commercial and
private UAS use in the [National Airspace System].”232 Stakeholders from the public

228. Richards & Solove, supra note 146, at 1924.
229. Id. at 1890, 1909–10 (advocating for a move to adopt the British approach to the tort
of confidentiality).
230. Nabiha Syed & Michael Berry, Journo-Drones: A Flight Over the Legal Landscape,
AM. BAR ASS’N: COMM. LAW (June 29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/communications_law/publications/communications_lawyer/2014/june/journodrones_flight
_over_legal_landscape/ [https://perma.cc/GWR9-R5AR].
231. Press Release, Rep. Edward J. Markey, Markey Releases Discussion Draft of Drone
Privacy and Transparency Legislation (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news
/press-releases/markey-releases-discussion-draft-of-drone-privacy-and-transparency
-legislation [https://perma.cc/6QQS-7VVW].
232. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR UAS PRIVACY,
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and private sector233 worked to develop a framework in an effort to protect citizens’
privacy with emerging technologies, releasing a voluntary best practices guide on
May 18, 2016.234
The focus of the best practices for UAS privacy guide is on data collected via
UAS that “identifies a particular person. If data collected by UAS likely will not be
linked to an individual’s name or other personally identifiable information, or if the
data is altered so that a specific person is not recognizable, it is not covered data.”235
Both commercial and noncommercial drone operators must use reasonable care when
employing technology with their drone that could collect other individual’s private
and personal information.236 Commercial drone operators should notify the public if
they are utilizing technology that may collect sensitive information by creating
privacy policies, available for review by potentially affected parties.237 Depending
on the specific user of the drone, notice may best be provided to neighbors on a flightby-flight basis, or by posting an established policy available on a company
website.238 If drone use may result in a collection of individuals’ identifying or
personal data, the notices or policies should include information on the purpose for
which the drone will collect the data, the kinds of data that may be collected, and

TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia
/publications/uas_privacy_best_practices_6-21-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JN6C-LH94]
[hereinafer NTIA, VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES].
233. For a partial list of stakeholders involved, see id. at 11. “The best practices agreed to
by a diverse group of stakeholders—including privacy and consumer advocates, industry,
news organizations and trade associations—represent an important step in building consumer
trust, giving users the tools to innovate in this space in a manner that respects privacy . . . .”
Angela Simpson, Finding Common Ground on UAS, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (May
19, 2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/finding-common-ground-uas [https://perma
.cc/GP7J-WWFV].
234. NTIA, VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES, supra note 232. The Voluntary Best Practices
guide refers to the collection of information that identifies a particular person as “covered
data,” which the guide urges operators to follow the best practices to protect the privacy of the
covered data. Id. at 4. The Voluntary Best Practices Guide was updated on June 21, 2016 to
include background information. Multi-stakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (June 21, 2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/otherpublication/2016/multistakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-systems
[https://perma.cc
/4LDZ-8KZQ].
235. NTIA, VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES, supra note 232, at 4.
236. Id. at 5. The voluntary best practices guide refers to the collection of information that
identifies a particular person as “covered data,” which the guide urges operators to follow the
best practices to protect the privacy of the covered data. Id. at 3–4.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id.
What qualifies as a practicable and reasonable effort to provide prior notice will
depend on operators’ circumstances and the context of the UAS operation. For
example, delivery UAS operators may provide customers with an estimated time
of delivery. Real estate professionals using UAS may provide a home seller (and
possibly immediate neighbors) with prior notice of the estimated date of UAS
photography of the property. Hobbyist UAS operators may not need to notify
nearby individuals of UAS fight in the vicinity.
Id. at 5 n.2.
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how the information may be retained and who may have access to the information.239
Further, the drone operator should have a policy detailing how an individual may
submit privacy and security concerns or grievances.240
Though providing notice or a detailed policy may be impracticable for
commercial and noncommercial drone operators every time the drone is sent into the
air, best practices suggest that each operator should at least show care when operating
drones and storing potentially private information obtained using a drone. 241
Individuals should not employ drone technology to intentionally collect private or
identifying information.242 Identifying information that may be collected while
operating a drone should not be unreasonably retained or shared by the operator. 243
If potentially private information is retained for an intended purpose—based on the
type of operator—particularly commercial operators should make a reasonable effort
to secure the information by establishing security policies, monitoring their computer
storage and system, and training employees with access.244 Complying with the
evolving federal, state, and local laws and developing internal privacy policies will
help protect drone operators from invading another citizen’s privacy. 245
Notwithstanding this federal acknowledgment of the privacy concerns posed by
drone technology, states are still responsible for drafting specific statutes protecting
individual privacy. Several states have addressed the privacy issues related to the use
of drones by private citizens. Idaho, for example, prohibits any “person or entity”
from using a drone to photograph an individual for purposes of publishing or publicly
disseminating such a photograph, without the individual’s consent.246 Nevada’s
statute creates a cause of action for impermissible drone flights over one’s property
through a trespass-based statute.247 Moreover, Florida’s criminal statutes prohibit the
use of drones that interfere with an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.248
Specifically, the statute prohibits the use of drones by:

239. Id. at 5.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 6.
242. Id. Particularly, according to the voluntary best practices guide, “UAS operators
should not use covered data for the following purposes without consent: employment
eligibility, promotion, or retention; credit eligibility; or health care treatment eligibility other
than when expressly permitted by and subject to the requirements of a sector-specific
regulatory framework.” Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. IDAHO CODE § 21-213 (2018) (creating a civil cause of action against any person in
violation of this statute). It is possible, however, that this statute could violate the First
Amendment. See WELLS C. BENNETT, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION,
CIVILIAN DRONES, PRIVACY, AND THE FEDERAL–STATE BALANCE 6 (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/civilian_drones_privacy_bennett
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU8D-YRHT] (“When at last the judiciary applies the law of ‘private’
privacy to drone surveillance, many statutory or common law rules could be narrowed, or even
invalidated, on First Amendment grounds.”).
247. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.103 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016); see also OR. REV.
STAT. § 837.380 (2017) (creating a cause of action for damages based in trespass).
248. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015 & Supp. 2019). The statute carves out
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(b) A person, a state agency, or a political subdivision . . . may not use a
drone equipped with an imaging device to record an image of privately
owned real property or of the owner, tenant, occupant, invitee, or licensee
of such property with the intent to conduct surveillance on the individual
or property captured in the image in violation of such person's reasonable
expectation of privacy without his or her written consent. For purposes
of this section, a person is presumed to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy on his or her privately owned real property if he or she is not
observable by persons located at ground level in a place where they have
a legal right to be, regardless of whether he or she is observable from the
air with the use of a drone.249
According to the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, as of 2016,
“[t]hirty one localities ban the use of drones to invade a person’s privacy by
conducting surveillance or recording private activities, and . . . [f]orty eight localities
restrict either the use of drones over private property or the use of drones to invade
privacy in any way.”250
Reminiscent of common-law privacy torts, Wisconsin’s statute states that a
private individual commits a misdemeanor by using a drone to “photograph, record,
or otherwise observe another individual in a place or location where the individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 251 Whereas Tennessee prohibits, with
exceptions, the use of an “unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual or
privately owned real property . . . with the intent to conduct surveillance on the
individual or property captured in the image,” when the operator retains or publicizes
the images.252
Moreover, “[t]he prohibitions against invading privacy, intruding upon seclusion,
publishing private facts, and stalking all might be implicated when a drone, heavily

exceptions for various permissible uses of drones. Id. Notably, it allows drones to be used for
business purposes if licensed, but “this exception does not apply to a profession in which the
licensee’s authorized scope of practice includes obtaining information about the identity,
habits, conduct, movements, whereabouts, affiliations, associations, transactions, reputation,
or character of any society, person, or group of persons.” Id. § 934.50(4)(d). This caveat
furthers the state’s initial goal of protecting individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy
while still allowing licensed businesses the ability to utilize the advantages of drones in
Florida.
249. Id. § 934.50(3)(b).
250. ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE AT BARD COLL.,
DRONES AT HOME: LOCAL AND STATE DRONE LAWS 2 (2017), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/files
/2017/03/CSD-Local-and-State-Drone-Laws-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ7F-EQ8H].
251. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.10 (West 2018).
252. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-903 (2014 & Supp. 2017). There is a defense to prosecution
under this statute “for the possession of an image [if] the person destroyed the image as soon
as the person had knowledge that the image was captured in violation of § 39-13-903.” Id. §
39-13-904. Moreover, the statute provides many exceptions where it is lawful to capture an
image with an unmanned aircraft. Id. § 39-13-902(a)(1), (7) (listing exceptions, including
“[f]or purposes of professional or scholarly research and development by a person acting on
behalf of an institution of higher education” and “[w]ith the consent of the individual who
owns or lawfully occupies the real property captured in the image”).
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sensored up, hears or sees somebody who doesn’t wish to be heard or seen.”253 A
traditional privacy-tort analysis does not sufficiently provide for the level of potential
invasions when drones and accompanying technology are utilized. Thus, drone
technology should be added to the court’s considerations when determining privacytort cases. Specifically, the common-law intrusion tort254 is not sufficient for modern
technology, which may leave plaintiffs without redress for invasive intrusions into
their private affairs.255
While the existing statutory schemes provide some relief for victims of privacy
invasions arising from the use of drone technology, many of these statutes are merely
speculative since a private individual has not yet brought a sustainable case alleging
a violation of privacy from nongovernmental drone use. As Wells C. Bennett of the
Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings notes, without any “case[s] turning
on the relationship between individual privacy rights and civilian drone
surveillance,” it is difficult to discern whether one state’s drone-privacy statute is
more effective than another state’s.256 And while legislators have analogous cases
with more established technologies—for example, helicopters equipped with
cameras and everyday cell-phone use—and can make “some educated guesses about
what rules will work best” for drone protections, the analogies only go so far. 257
Bennett notes that “the efficacy and legality of new drone regulations will probably
only come into relief once private drone flight and private drone surveillance become
somewhat more commonplace.”258
IV. CHALLENGES & RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Problems with Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claims Involving Drones
Prosecuting Prosser’s concept of the “right to be left alone” when a drone has
intruded upon an individual’s right to privacy comes with many challenges. This
Section details the numerous issues, including (1) naming a defendant; (2)
establishing intent; (3) determining what is held out in public to establish an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy; and (4) determining offensiveness of

253. BENNETT, supra note 246, at 3.
254. See Eli A. Meltz, Note, No Harm, No Foul? “Attempted” Invasion of Privacy and the
Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3431, 3440–43 (2015) (discussing
states’ laws of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion).
255. This Article notes that although current statutes and common-law privacy torts may
not sufficiently protect individuals, there are other avenues for victims of drone-related
invasions. For example, drones recording audio may be subject to wire-tapping laws and drone
operators may be liable under Peeping Tom laws or similar harassment causes of action, or
anti-paparazzi laws for photos captured when an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See Syed & Berry, supra note 230. However, this Article focuses on the privacy tort
of intrusion upon seclusion and similar statutes, and therefore, it does not discuss the potential
interplay between common-law privacy torts and other avenues for relief.
256. BENNETT, supra note 246, at 5.
257. Id. at 6.
258. Id.
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an intrusion. The following Section provides recommendations for states and courts
to consider when the right to privacy and drones collide.
1. Naming a Defendant
Even without the luxury of foresight into the actual application of the state
statutes, several concerns in even bringing forth a drone-related privacy claim are
clear. For example, establishing the drone’s owner in order to name a defendant
appears to be almost impossible. Imagine being in the confines of your home where
a drone floats above a public street but peers into your window as you dress for the
day. Even if that happened every day like clockwork, unless the drone falls to the
ground and can be retrieved, how is the victim of such an intrusion to determine the
owner of the drone? While the FAA requires drones to be visibly outfitted with their
registration number259 (unless the registration number can be placed elsewhere on
the drone that does not require a tool to enter),260 an average person inside their home
is likely unable to view the number to then conduct due diligence to uncover the
owner. And even if they did connect a name to the registration number, federal
regulations note that “registration is not evidence of aircraft ownership in any
proceeding in which ownership of an unmanned aircraft by a particular person is in
issue.”261 Furthermore, a drone sighting may still be an unusual and rare occurrence,
but with drones rapidly increasing in popularity, it may become almost impossible
to discern whether the drone spotted lingering yesterday is the same one looming in
the same place today.
2. Establishing Intent
Another concern surrounding the prosecution of an intrusion upon seclusion tort
under common law or statute when a drone is involved is the requirement that the
plaintiff prove intent.262 An intrusion must have been intentional, which requires that
the operator desire the intrusion or know with substantial certainty that invasion
would result from his actions.263 And some states are even more restrictive, requiring

259. 14 C.F.R. § 48.200 (2018) (stating that the aircraft must display a unique identifier,
which is either the registration number of the individual or the aircraft given upon the
completion of the registration, or if authorized, the serial number of a small drone).
260. Id.§ 48.205 (stating that the identifier must be “legible,” affixed “by any means
necessary to ensure it will remain affixed” throughout the duration of the flight, and must be
“readily accessible and visible upon inspection”). “A unique identifier enclosed in a
compartment is readily accessible if it can be accessed without the use of any tool.” Id. The
FAA allows operators to mark their drone with their registration number by engraving, using
a permanent label, or a permanent marker. How to Label Your UAS, supra note 67. Although
the FAA states that the number must be visible, it notes that “[y]ou can mark inside the battery
compartment if it doesn’t require a tool to open.” Id.
261. 14 C.F.R. § 48.25(c) (2018).
262. See Benjamin D. Mathews, Comment, Potential Tort Liability for Personal Use of
Drone Aircraft, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573, 587 (2015) (“Thus, a question for juries, and
eventually lawmakers, will be whether the intentional act of flying a drone is sufficient to give
rise to a claim of intrusion upon seclusion.”).
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977); 2 DAN B. DOBBS,
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shame, mental suffering, or humiliation to be demonstrated to permit recovery. 264 In
reviewing selected legal issues regarding drones in domestic airspace, the
Congressional Research Service posits that “the location of the target of the
surveillance is, in many cases, determinative of whether someone has a viable claim
for intrusion upon seclusion.”265 For example, generally, “conducting surveillance of
a person while within the confines of his home will constitute an intrusion upon
seclusion.”266 But with drones, intent is likely more difficult to prove. This is
especially true when photographs, audio recordings, or other private data is not
originally obtained intentionally during flight but is then later used or stored and
realized to be collectively pervasive. Is “intent” couched in the desire to intrude over
another’s property and whatever personal data is collected from the drone technology
is likewise “intentional”? Or must an individual desire to obtain personal information
or observe personal details when his or her drone takes off? Florida’s criminal drone
statute, similar to an analogous common-law privacy tort claim, requires that the
drone operator have “the intent to conduct surveillance on the individual or property
captured in the image in violation of such person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
without his or her written consent” for an actionable claim. 267 Requiring specific
intent renders captured images by mistake, accident, or incidentally nonactionable,
which is likely to be a very high burden for a plaintiff to meet. 268
3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Furthermore, establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the age of drones
equipped with advanced technology also poses a problem in the prosecution of an
intrusion upon seclusion claim. The Uniform Law Commission and its Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act Drafting Committee is in the early stages of drafting laws to
harmonize tort law related to drones.269 But in its efforts, the Uniform Law
Commission notes the potential concerns and needed consideration of “whether a
flight in compliance with either Part 107 or Part 101 is ‘from a public vantage

PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29 (2d ed. 2011).
264. See, e.g., Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., 574 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007);
DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594, 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
265. ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RES. SERV., INTEGRATION OF
DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 13 (2013), https://law.ku.edu
/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/media_law/Integration_of_Drones_into_Domestic_Airspace_Sel
ected_Legal_Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ6X-9372].
266. Id. (citing Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Penn. 1996)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Lovgren v.
Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 1989).
267. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(3)(b) (West 2015 & Supp. 2019).
268. Florida’s New Drone Law: Fulltime Employment for Lawyers?, DRONE L. (May 19,
2015),
http://dronelaw.com/2015/05/19/floridas-new-drone-law-fulltime-employment-for
-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/D7RF-EY6J].
269. Memorandum from Gregory S. McNeal to Committee Members and Observers of the
Tort Law Relating to Drones Act Drafting Committee 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://web
.archive.org/web/20180530201935/http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/drones,%20tort
%20law%20relating%20to/2017dec_TLRD_Issues%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTC8
-DWA4].
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point’”270 for establishing a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy for
prosecution of privacy tort claims. While this issue is more analogous to surveillance
precedent, such as the helicopter used in Florida v. Riley to surveil, it remains
unresolved and a serious concern when a drone is involved. 271
Florida’s drone statute appears to proactively address this concern. The statute
prohibits the use of drones that interfere with an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy and makes clear that:
a person is presumed to have a reasonable expectation of privacy on his
or her privately owned real property if he or she is not observable by
persons located at ground level in a place where they have a legal right
to be, regardless of whether he or she is observable from the air with the
use of a drone.272
In contrast, other states’ drone-privacy laws do not delve into what “reasonable
expectation of privacy” includes and whether an individual is protected in a private
setting even if the person can be viewed from where the drone is aloft.
Moreover, in determining whether a drone has intruded upon someone’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, the victim’s location is relevant “to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence of intrusiveness, [but] it is not
determinative of whether an intrusion into one’s ‘solitude and seclusion’ has
occurred.”273 Although individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
for that which is held out to the public,274 the size, shape, longevity, maneuverability,
and technological additions on drones make the question of “what is held out to the
public” more complex.
Therefore, courts analyzing an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy for
an intrusion upon seclusion claim involving drones must focus on the location of the
alleged intrusion. But they must also consider the drone technology and the added
technological features and advancements. “An airborne droid might take in more
information over a much longer period of time than a human eye or ear; and it might
also find its way to areas where other aerial platforms might not be able to go.”275

270. Id. at 10.
271. 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion). In Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court held
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when police flew a helicopter over defendant’s
backyard at approximately 400 feet and took photographs of the marijuana growing below in
a greenhouse. Id. at 451–52. The plurality determined that the two exposed sides of the
greenhouse subjected Riley to a reasonably objective search from the public airspace above,
despite his reasonable subjective expectation of privacy. Id. at 450–51. Although Riley
involved the government’s use of a helicopter, it notes the similar concerns of “public
airspace” that may arise in private right of actions. Id.
272. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(3)(b).
273. Evans v. Detlefsen, 857 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1988).
274. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c. (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (stating
that that there is generally no liability for photographing or observing a person while in public
“since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye”);
Prosser, supra note 2, at 383.
275. BENNETT, supra note 246, at 1.
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4. Difficulty Meeting Intrusion that is Highly Offensive to a Reasonable Person
Furthermore, plaintiffs seeking relief under an intrusion upon seclusion theory
involving a drone may have difficulty meeting the substantial interference and highly
offensive standard required to recover. Courts must employ a fact-intensive analysis
when considering whether an intrusion upon seclusion claim rises to the level of
substantial interference. Courts already focus on the motive of the intruder and the
context of the intrusion,276 and must also consider the type and extent of technology
used in the intrusion.
Generally, interference of seclusion must be substantial277 and “repeated with
such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding” and “becomes
a substantial burden to his existence . . . .”278 This high burden is already difficult to
establish in the prosecution of an intrusion upon seclusion claim, and it will likely be
even more difficult when the privacy invasion involves drone technology. For
example, plaintiffs in Texas failed to establish a claim for intrusion upon seclusion,
and other claims, against Google after discovering that it had taken “colored imagery
of their residence, including the swimming pool, from a vehicle in their residence
driveway months earlier without obtaining any privacy waiver or authorization.” 279
The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not suffer substantial and highly offensive
intrusion upon seclusion from the continuous filming of their property captured by
the camera’s fleeting presence, and the plaintiffs did not allege they were inside the
home or personally observed.280
With drone technology, a reasonable jury may be more likely to find that a single
intrusion was substantial interference and highly offensive.281 An intrusion can be
physical, or an intrusion may be from sensory invasions. 282 Thus, drones may not

276. DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 265, at 19.
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
278. Id. “Courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that repeated and continuous calls in
an attempt to collect a debt give rise to a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.” Panahiasl v.
Gurney, No. 04-04479 JF, 2007 WL 738642, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (citing Joseph v.
J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2003)); see also, e.g., Stonum v.
U.S. Airways, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 894, 905–06 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that neither an
investigator’s “four innocuous telephone calls over a two-month period” nor plain view
observations would “cause outrage, mental suffering, shame, or humiliation in a person
of ordinary sensibilities”).
279. Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2010).
280. Id. at 279, 283 (Google taking photographs of people’s residence; “there are no facts
suggesting that Google acted maliciously or recklessly or that Google intentionally
disregarded the Borings’ rights.”).
281. In certain cases, a single intrusion has been sufficient to maintain a claim of intrusion
upon seclusion. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (finding that reasonable people could determine that video recording a man being
resuscitated after a seizure in his own bedroom “at a time of vulnerability and confusion” was
highly offensive conduct); Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on an intrusion upon
seclusion claim where the defendant insurance company altered a signed medical release to
obtain private medical information).
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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only loom over someone’s property but may also utilize numerous types of
technology to intrude without physically intruding.283
B. Prosecuting an Intrusion Upon Seclusion Claim in the Context of Drones
Based on the numerous concerns above, one possible way to even the playing
field in the prosecution of drone-related intrusion upon seclusion claims is for
statutory schemes to implement a rebuttable presumption that a defendant has
intruded upon the plaintiff’s seclusion. This type of presumption is already found in
Wisconsin’s statute on “Damages by Aircraft or Spacecraft.” 284 Although this statute
does not explicitly refer to drones, and instead relates more to liability of owners of
aircrafts for physical damage caused by the flight of such aircraft, it is still a workable
base for prosecuting drone-related privacy cases. Specifically, the statute states:
The liability of the owner, lessee and pilot of every aircraft or spacecraft
operating over the lands or waters of this state for injuries or damage to
persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent,
descent or flight of such aircraft or spacecraft, or the dropping or falling
of the aircraft or spacecraft or of any object or material therefrom, shall
be determined by the law applicable to torts on land, except that there
shall be a presumption of liability on the part of the owner, lessee or pilot,
as the case may be, where injury or damage is caused by the dropping or
falling of the aircraft or spacecraft or of any object or material therefrom,
which presumption may be rebutted by proof that the injury or damage
was not caused by negligence on the part of the owner, lessee or pilot
and the burden of proof in such case shall be upon such owner, lessee or
pilot to show absence of negligence on his or her part.285
Additionally, Nevada has a similar liability statute where “[t]he owner of every
aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters of this state is presumed liable for
injuries to persons or property . . . beneath.” 286 It goes on to state:
The presumption of liability of the owner, or of the owner and lessee,
may be rebutted by proof that the injury was not caused by negligence of
the owner or lessee, or of any person operating the aircraft with the
permission of the owner, lessee or any person maintaining or repairing
the aircraft with the permission of the owner or lessee. 287

283. Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and Privacy Torts
As Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 402 (2017) (“Given the capabilities of
drones, it is relatively easy for operators to capture images inside and outside of one's home
without physically trespassing on to one’s property.”).
284. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 114.05 (West 2018).
285. Id.
286. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.060 (LexisNexis 2012).
287. Id.
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Thus, the Wisconsin and Nevada statutes impose a rebuttable presumption that the
owner of the aircraft is liable for the damage caused by the torts committed against
the persons or property beneath.
In applying this rule to privacy-tort claims, a plaintiff should first have to allege
a prima facie case of intrusion upon seclusion. For example, a plaintiff may
sufficiently establish a prima facie case by alleging sufficient facts that a drone (with
a reasonable description of the drone) was hovering outside his or her bathroom
window while he or she was changing (at the approximate time and date). If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the defendant shall be presumed to have
intruded upon the plaintiff’s seclusion. Then, utilizing Wisconsin’s rebuttable
presumption standard for physical damage caused by aircrafts, the defendant must
rebut the presumption by proving that they did not intrude upon the plaintiff’s
seclusion. The defendant could establish this in a variety of ways, such as providing
evidence of flight tracking data, video or photo footage taken, or establishing that a
third-party pilot was in control and/or possession of the drone at the date and time
alleged, because the defendant is in the best position to know whether his or her
drone intruded. Moreover, a prudent drone owner would have the flight data
information and access to any video/photo/audio recordings.
Rebutting such a presumption appears to be similar to the successful tactic used
by the New York citizen discussed inter alia, who was arrested after taking photos
and video of a medical group building using his drone. 288 During the trial, he
presented evidence rebutting his intent (flying his drone to take “videos and photos
of the façade of the structure” while waiting for his mother’s medical appointment to
conclude) and the ability of the drone to intrude (establishing that the drone’s camera
was not equipped with a zoom lens, the building’s windows were tinted, and the
footage did not show the building’s interior). 289 Additionally, he presented the
drone’s footage to the jury to demonstrate that he did not invade the privacy rights
of those in the medical building.290 The presentation of this evidence appears to have
had some effect on the jury, as the man was acquitted. 291
In summary, incorporating a rebuttable presumption into privacy-tort statutes will
likely resolve many of the practical difficulties in prosecuting such claims.
Moreover, it is reasonable for a drone operator to rebut the presumption that he or
she intruded into another’s seclusion once the plaintiff alleges a prima facie case, as
opposed to the burden remaining on the plaintiff to establish that the operator did in
fact intrude. Because, generally, a plaintiff would not be able to establish where
exactly the drone was located or what information the drone captured.
CONCLUSION
One of the most innovative technological advancements in recent years, drones
present difficult, and unintended, challenges for plaintiffs attempting to prove
common law privacy-tort claims. The common law invasion of privacy tort analysis

288.
289.
290.
291.

Zangla, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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as it stands is simply not sufficient to protect an individual’s right to privacy for torts
committed using the modern and complex technology of drones. Thus, the
consideration of drone technology must be weaved into analyzing whether the
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the intrusion was
highly offensive to a reasonable person. Only then will individuals who are the
victims of drone surveillance be given the opportunity to establish their intrusion
upon seclusion claims when the right to privacy and drones collide.

